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Non-representational cognitive science is a promising research field that provides an
alternative to the view of the brain as a “computer” filled with symbolic representations
of the world and cognition as “calculations” performed on those symbols. Autopoiesis
is a biological, bottom-up, non-representational theory of cognition, in which repre-
sentations and meaning are framed as explanatory concepts that are constituted in an
observer’s description of a cognitive system, not operational concepts in the system
itself. One of the problems of autopoiesis, and all non-representational theories, is that
they struggle with scaling up to high-level cognitive behaviour such as language.
The Iterated Learning Model is a theory of language evolution that shows that
certain features of language are explained not because of something happening in the
linguistic agent’s brain, but as the product of the evolution of the linguistic system
itself under the pressures of learnability and expressivity. Our goal in this work is to
combine an autopoietic approach with the cultural transmission chains that the ILM
uses, in order to provide the first step in an autopoietic explanation of the evolution of
language.
In order to do that, we introduce a simple, joint action physical task in which agents
are rewarded for dancing around each other in either of two directions, left or right. The
agents are simulated e-pucks, with continuous-time recurrent neural networks as ner-
vous systems. First, we adapt a biologically plausible reinforcement learning algorithm
based on spike-timing dependent plasticity tagging and dopamine reward signals. We
show that, using this algorithm, our agents can successfully learn the left/right dancing
task and examine how learning time influences the agents’ task success rates.
Following that, we link individual learning episodes in cultural transmission chains
and show that an expert agent’s initial behaviour is successfully transmitted in long
chains. We investigate the conditions under which these transmission chains break
down, as well as the emergence of behaviour in the absence of expert agents. By using
long transmission chains, we look at the boundary conditions for the re-establishment
of transmitted behaviour after chain breakdowns.
Bringing all the above experiments together, we discuss their significance for non-
representational cognitive science and draw some interesting parallels to existing It-
erated Learning research; finally, we close by putting forward a number of ideas for
additions and future research directions.
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In this thesis, we will describe a first step towards the combination of a non represen-
tational theory of cognition, autopoiesis, with a functionalist approach to evolutionary
linguistics, Iterated Learning. Our approach to this combination is practical: we will
make use of simulated robots, neural networks and joint action experiments. Nonethe-
less, it is informed and motivated by philosophical enquiries about the nature of human
cognition; what we aspire to be doing is “philosophy of mind using a screwdriver”
(Harvey, 2000). It seems fitting, then, to start by explaining what kind of “philosoph-
ical enquiries” led us to believe that the combination we mentioned is worthwhile in
the first place; this is what we will do in this first chapter.
1.1 The computational approach to cognition
A commonly held hypothesis in the fields of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Sci-
ence has been that cognitive agents use symbols to represent their environment, and
that the nature of cognition is the formal manipulation of these representations in-
side their brain. This assumption, usually referred to as the “computational hypothe-
sis” (Van Gelder, 1998) was perhaps most famously formulated by Newell and Simon
(1976) in their claim that “a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient
means for general intelligent action”. We can roughly translate this claim into the
following propositions:
(i) All known facts about the world are represented as symbols in an agent’s brain;
through some mechanism, sensory input updates these representations.
(ii) “Thinking”, or cognising, happens through computations on these symbolic rep-
resentations.
(iii) Finally, the agent acts on the world through its motor facilities.
1
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The symbolic approach is attractively intuitive; however, while it initially was
highly successful in “solving” high-level reasoning problems that could be captured
in a reasonably-sized set of symbolic rules (chess being the most obvious example),
it has proven particularly inept at facing seemingly easier cognitive problems such
as sensorimotor coordination, real world planning or common–sense reasoning (Van
Gelder, 1998). “General intelligence” was predicted to be solved “within 20 years” in
the 1970s (Russell and Norvig, 1995, p. 21), but we are still a long way from even
building systems with the cognitive capacities of human infants.
This is perhaps most visible in the field of robotics; much like humans and other
animals, robotic agents need to control a complex body in a real environment — an
environment not simple enough to be described using the propositional logics of sym-
bolic AI, in principle and in practice (Dreyfus, 2007). Indeed, motion control in the
real world has proven to be a notoriously difficult task; despite significant theoretical
and technological advances, “much work remains to be done” (Belta et al., 2007). One
reason for this inability to deal with “simple” sensorimotor coordination and cognitive
tasks is a manifestation of an issue that has plagued the field of Artificial Intelligence
since its very beginning. The issue (known as the frame problem) is the following:
how do we, as agents, decide what is relevant in a given situation and what is not?
Minsky (1977) has famously tried to answer this question by introducing the con-
cept of frames, or structures that represent and encode relevancy for a particular situa-
tion. The problem, however, goes deeper than that: to decide what situation we are in
(or what frame we are to use), we must have knowledge of what aspects of our envi-
ronment are relevant. To decide what aspects are relevant, in turn, requires us to know
what frame to use. This circularity poses a deep threat to Minsky’s frame system and
similar approaches (Dreyfus, 2007; Vervaeke et al., 2012).
The frame problem, in addition to posing a practical issue for the fields of robotics
and AI, has been appropriated by philosophers (Chow, 2013) as an epistemological ar-
gument against symbolic cognitive science approaches, adding to the arsenal of critics
that describe such approaches as a dead end in the goal of understanding human cogni-
tion (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1988; Dreyfus, 2007; Van Gelder and Port, 1995). In fact,
this philosophical debate pre-dates the field of cognitive science altogether; it can be
traced back to a long history of 20th century continental philosophers (notably Martin
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty) pointing out that rationalist views of cognition
(Hobbes’ proposal of “reasoning as computation” or Descartes’ “mental representa-
tions”) have fundamental issues with “significance and relevance” (Dreyfus, 2007).
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
1.2 The embodied approach to cognition
In fact, it is from continental philosophy’s focus on “acting in the world” that we are
provided with an alternative to the symbolic approach to cognition. This approach,
embodied cognition, is a popular research paradigm (Chemero, 2009) that recognises
that any attempt to explain cognition has to consider not only an agent’s brain but,
equally, its body and its situatedness in an environment. In other words, cognition is
the product of the interaction between brain, body and environment; however, because
these systems are so tightly interconnected, they can only be explained as a whole and
not independently from each other (Beer, 2000). This, then, constitutes a systemic
approach to cognition as opposed to the internalist computational approach.
A useful methodology to research cognition as a brain, body and environment in-
teraction comes from adopting what Chemero (2009) calls the “dynamical stance”:
the use of tools borrowed from dynamical systems theory to research cognitive phe-
nomena, analysing an agent’s brain, body and environment as interacting non-linear
dynamical systems (see also the “dynamical hypothesis” of Van Gelder, 1998). We
will use two experiments by Randall Beer to illustrate what such an approach looks
like.
The first experiment (Beer, 1995a) was a simulation of broadly insect-like agents.
Each of the agents had six independent legs that could “swing” in space, propelling
the agent forward if they were in contact with the ground; each leg was controlled by a
5-node continuous-time recurrent neural network.1 The agents had the task of moving
the furthest possible distance; using a genetic algorithm that selected agents for their
fitness in this task, Beer evolved agents that could reliably synchronise the swinging
of their legs into a stable walking gait.2
The second experiment (Beer, 2003) was a simulation of agents that exhibited a
behaviour more likely to be recognised as “cognitive”: categorical perception. This
time, the simulated agents had a sensory system (a basic visual system of seven “rays”
giving feedback on object collision) as well as a motor system (two motors, whose
combined motor forces allowed the agents to move horizontally); the task they were
asked to accomplish was to distinguish between “falling” objects of various shapes
ranging from perfect squares to circles.
1Continuous-time recurrent neural networks are approximators of dynamical systems, and are often
used in dynamical cognition research; we will come back to them in Chapter 4.
2Note that agents’ legs also had a sensor reporting the angle between the leg and the body; stable
(though less resilient to perturbation) walking gaits evolved with these sensors disabled as well.
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Once more, genetic algorithms selected agents for their fitness in this task and
produced evolved agents that could successfully categorise the objects using active
perception: while the input to the visual system was identical for all shapes when
stationary, by actively moving the agents were able to associate different shapes to
different sensory-motor patterns.
The most interesting part of Beer’s experiments, however, was that he performed
a detailed dynamical analysis of the evolved agents’ behaviour. In the case of the
“walking insects”, he showed that while all the agents exhibited very similar behaviour,
the networks were in some cases vastly different; furthermore, no discrete function of
the system could be mapped to a specific network node. Similarly, in the case of the
“categorisers”, the differentiation between shapes could not be attributed to specific
points in the network; it only arose from the interaction between the evolved networks
and the environment. While only the weights of the nodes are changed by the process
of evolution, Beer claims, what is selected for is “a property of the dynamics of the
entire coupled system” (Beer, 2003, p. 236).
Beer’s experiments establish that autonomous, arguably (minimally) cognitive be-
haviour3 does not equate necessarily to the manipulation of symbolic representations;
by doing so, they provide a practical, workable alternative to the computational view
of cognition. (For an in-depth discussion of more experiments that adopt similar dy-
namical approaches see Chemero, 2009.)
1.3 A note on data-driven approaches
In the last years, a new and altogether different approach to Artificial Intelligence based
on using machine learning and vast amounts of example or input data has been attract-
ing publicity through important milestones; for example, beating human competitors
in the games of Jeopardy (Lally and Fodor, 2011) and Go (Silver et al., 2016).
At the same time, similar approaches have been achieving significant advances in
problems that had, until now, proved very challenging for computers to solve; good ex-
amples of such problems would be speech recognition (Amodei et al., 2015), machine
translation (Sutskever et al., 2014) and image classification tasks (Krizhevsky et al.,
2012); for a comprehensive overview of deep learning, one of the most successful
data-driven approaches, see LeCun et al. (2015).
3This is a point of contention; Edelman (2003), for instance, describes Beer’s experiment as a “toy
problem”.
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However, these data-driven approaches make no claims regarding the nature of
cognition, nor do they try to give any insight into cognitive phenomena; instead, the
problem domains mentioned above are treated as purely engineering challenges. For
this reason, we will not elaborate further on such approaches or try to compare them to
the computational or embodied approaches to cognition; while surpassing the results
of either of these approaches in the fields mentioned, and while definitely relevant for
AI as “computer science”, they are not relevant to cognitive science per se or to the
goals that we have set out to for this thesis.
1.4 Representations and “scaling up”
Returning to the embodied approach to cognition, even within the embodied cogni-
tive science community, there is a long standing debate on the importance and need
of mental representations. One side completely rejects representations as a concept
that is required to explain human cognition; the philosophical critique of Dreyfus and
Dreyfus (1988) and the modelling experiments of Beer (2000) belong to this side, as
do the “dynamical hypothesis” research programme of Van Gelder and Port (1995)
and the coordination dynamics of Kelso (1995). Chemero (2009), firmly in the anti-
representational camp himself, groups all these approaches under the title “Radical
Embodied Cognitive Science”.
The other side, which would be the “non-radical” embodied cognitive science,
recognises the importance of embodiment in the study of cognitive behaviour but joins
the critics of non-representational approaches (Edelman, 2003) in their claim that any
explanation that makes no use of representations as a concept might work for low-
level behaviour but cannot scale up to what Clark and Toribio (1994, p. 28) term
“representation-heavy” domains, two major examples of which are high-level planning
and language. Even a dynamical systems approach, the less radical camp claims, does
not theoretically preclude representations (Bullock, 2004), which can take the form of
“trajectories or attractors of various kinds, or even such exotica as transformations of
attractor arrangements as a system’s control parameters change” (Van Gelder and Port,
1995).
An alternative approach to combine representations and embodied cognition comes
from action–oriented or minimal representations. These representations, unlike the
traditional representations of the computational approach to cognition, would in the
words of Wheeler (2005, p.197) mirror “how the world [...] is itself encoded in terms
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of possibilities for action”. Whether these minimal representations should still count
as representations is, however, also a much debated topic (Gallagher, 2008; Routledge
et al., 2008); as is the matter of whether there really is a need for this kind of “contam-
ination” of the radical dynamical approach (Garzón, 2008).
1.5 Language
At the same time, a different but related debate is taking place amongst scientists inves-
tigating the origins of language. On one side, nativist accounts of language evolution
posit that language is encoded in a dedicated, biologically evolved “language faculty”
(Chomsky, 1995; Pinker and Bloom, 1990). The claim usually involves the evolution
of symbolic thought capacity in one of our close biological ancestors; this “language of
thought” then gets externalised into human language (see for example Chomsky, 2007,
pp. 24). This rings very close to the computational view of cognition as symbolic ma-
nipulation; indeed, Chomsky’s conclusions have been very influential in establishing
the computational hypothesis in cognitive science (see Chemero, 2009, p. 6).
On the other side, a growing number of researchers have been questioning this
nativist view and adopting more systemic approaches. One such approach, Iterated
Learning, stands out in our view by establishing that certain features of language can
be explained by its nature as a culturally transmitted system (Kirby, 2002a); instead of
biological evolution encoding language structure in human brains, it is language itself
that evolves structure through its transmission in iterated learning chains.
Taking a step back from both debates, the fact remains that non-representational
accounts of cognition are faced with a genuine problem: language is representational
by definition, as linguistic statements refer to objects or events (Ikegami and Zlatev,
2007, p. 242). Any non-representational theory, then, needs to be able to explain the
representational character of language in order to be complete.
However, while the representational nature of language is a major challenge to non-
representational accounts of cognition, it also presents the potential for a very power-
ful explanatory mechanism. Working out how the representational structure of lan-
guage emerges from a dynamical substrate is only a short step away from a systemic,
bottom-up explanation of the emergence of representations and symbolic thought from
language. Such an explanation has interesting parallels to Vygotskian views of thought
as internalised language (as opposed to language as externalised thought; see Donald,
2000, p. 33).
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Arguably, the best candidate that can extend a bridge from dynamical low-level
behaviour to language is the theory of Autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980); a
complete and rigorous theory of cognition as a biological phenomenon. Autopoiesis
is a very influential theory within the non-representational cognitive science camp; we
conveniently omitted any mention of it so far with the goal of discussing it (along with
Iterated Learning) in detail in Chapter 2.
We believe that the intersection between dynamical cognitive science as a sys-
temic approach to human cognition and non-nativist approaches to language evolution
has fascinating potential; it offers a glimpse at the connection between pre-symbolic
and human-level cognition, as well as a bottom-up explanation of the emergence and
grounding of representations. This is the motivation that drives the work we will
present in this thesis. Our goal, of course, is not to provide this explanation in its
entirety, but to take a first step towards it.
1.6 Contributions
In this thesis, we take the first step towards an autopoietic account of language structure
by establishing that cultural transmission chains, an essential component of the Iterated
Learning account of the evolution of language, can be instantiated from an autopoietic,
non-representational substrate. Our contributions are the following:
1. We propose the combination of Autopoiesis and Iterated Learning as a promis-
ing practical approach to an autopoietic account of language structure, and a
joint action task (“L/R dancing”) that allows us to bridge the theoretical incom-
patibilities between the two theories.
2. We design and build a system that allows us to run experiments of cultural trans-
mission chains with simulated robots performing the L/R dancing task; in order
to do so, we adapt a biologically plausible learning algorithm that allows the
simulated robots to learn the dancing task.
3. We demonstrate successful cultural transmission chains and the spontaneous
emergence of dancing between interacting agents; we also connect the behaviour
of the system to issues of current interest to Iterated Learning research.
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1.7 Thesis outline
The rest of this thesis is organised in the following chapters:
In Chapter 2 we introduce Autopoiesis as a theory of cognition and Iterated
Learning as a model of language evolution; we consider the problems that arise
from a potential combination of these two fields and propose ways around these
problems.
In Chapter 3 we detail the design of a system and a task (“L/R dancing”) that
will allow us to build transmission chains, needed for Iterated Learning, while
following the constraints introduced by an autopoietic approach.
In Chapter 4 we describe the implementation of a biologically plausible rein-
forcement learning algorithm and establish that agents using this algorithm are
able to learn the dancing task; we examine how learning time influences the
agents’ success rate at the task.
In Chapter 5 we connect individual dancing episodes into cultural transmission
chains and establish that stable chains are possible; we examine the stability of
the chains as a function of agent learning time.
In Chapter 6 we look at the spontaneous emergence of dancing behaviour in
the absence of pre-trained agents, in both isolated interacting agent pairs and in
cultural transmission chains.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we bring everything together and discuss the results of all
experiments as a whole, connecting them to Iterated Learning and Autopoiesis
research; we conclude by presenting a list of potential future research directions.
Chapter 2
Background & related work
In this chapter we will examine two leading fields in the areas of interest for this the-
sis: the cognitive theory of Autopoiesis, which aims to provide a complete account of
how life and cognition are based on biology; and the research paradigm of Iterated
Learning, that shows how the transmission of language from generation to generation
leads to the evolution of linguistic structure. We will consider the problems that arise




One of the most influential contributions in non-representational embodied cognitive
science has come from two Chilean biologists, Humberto Maturana and Francisco
Varela, who in 1972 introduced the concept of “autopoiesis”. Around this concept,
which we will explain in this section, Maturana and Varela built a complete biological
theory of cognition; introduced in their book Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realiza-
tion of the Living (Maturana and Varela, 1980), this theory was enriched in numerous
subsequent books and publications (most notably Maturana and Varela, 1992; Varela
et al., 2000) and has been a major influence in a plethora of fields. In the cognitive
sciences, these include modern philosophy of mind (with the most prominent example
being Alva Noë’s work— Noë, 2004; O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Noe, 2009), Artificial
Intelligence and robotics (Morse and Ziemke, 2007; Froese and Ziemke, 2009; Froese
and Di Paolo, 2011). The power of autopoiesis as a theory, however, is possibly best
attested by its effect on more distant fields such as sociology (influencing scholars
9
Chapter 2. Background & related work 10
like Luhmann and Habermas, as discussed in Leydesdorff, 2000; Luhmann, 1986) and
architecture (Schumacher, 2011).
Maturana and Varela’s theoretical biology starts from the recognition of the in-
herent circularity present in any definition of living systems as objects observed and
described (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p. v) and goes on to define life and cognition as
the property of autopoietic organisms: autonomous, operationally closed systems that
both create and specify themselves. As a complete theory, it provides the explanatory
power to study all aspects of cognition, including joint action, communication, social
constructs and language; however, as is often the case with complete theories, it is de-
scribed in an idiosyncratic language and comes bundled with a number of definitions.
While we could not hope to explain all aspects of the theory in detail, in this chapter
we will attempt to introduce some of the basic concepts of autopoietic theory that are
relevant for the work we will present in this thesis.
2.1.1.1 Autopoietic systems
Autopoiesis is “a theory of the organisation of living organisms as autonomous en-
tities” (Maturana, 1975); an autopoietic system is defined as a system of molecular
networks and interactions that:
1. Produce themselves. The organisation of this set of networks and interactions is
such that they generate themselves.
2. Specify their own limits. Some of the components that are part of the system
form a boundary, a limit to this network of interactions.
In other words, an autopoietic system’s organisation and boundary are maintained as
products of its own operation. While this process of self-production and self-definition
is maintained, the system is question is an autopoietic organism and is alive: in this
way, the definition of autopoiesis is at the same time a definition of life.
The boundary created by an autopoietic system allows us, as an outside observer,
to refer to it as a unity. This distinction is always made in contrast to an environment
or background which Maturana names the autopoietic system’s medium. The medium
and the autopoietic organism are mutually specified; neither of them can be defined
independently, and by defining one we are also defining the other.
Since an autopoietic system both defines and produces itself, it is classified as an
operationally closed system. This means that the system’s behavioural space is gener-
ated from within and not dictated from outside; in other words, it only depends on its
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Figure 2.1: Sketch of an autopoietic system interacting with its environment (a) and of
two autopoietic systems in structural coupling with each other (b).
current structure and previous states and not on anything that is part of the environment
(or “medium”).
Even though the domain of possible states the system can find itself in is generated
by the autopoietic system and not by its medium, the environment can interact with
the system through perturbations that trigger state transitions (Fig. 2.1a). The his-
tory of structural changes that an autopoietic system goes through as a result of such
perturbations constitute the ontogeny of the system.
2.1.1.2 Structural coupling
Just as an autopoietic system can interact with its environment, it can also interact with
other (possibly autopoietic) systems. It is important to note that from the viewpoint
of a given organism (autopoietic system) there can be no distinction between its en-
vironment and another organism; we, however, as outside observers, can make that
distinction. Interactions between two organisms, when recurrent, can lead to plastic
structural changes in both systems, thus changing the possible future state space of
each system. Whenever there is a history of such reciprocal plastic interactions, we
can speak of structural coupling between the two systems (Fig. 2.1b). A special case
of structural coupling would be a series of autopoietic systems connected through a
reproductive chain while maintaining adaptation; this is the phylogeny of a species.
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2.1.1.3 Behaviour and the nervous system
Even the simplest autopoietic systems interact in some way with their environment. We
can define this organism-environment interaction as the organism’s behaviour. Once
more, this definition is not of something intrinsic to the organism but a distinction
made by us as external observer. In other words, behaviour is not something that the
organism does but rather a way for the observer to refer to the interaction taking place
between an autopoietic organism and its environment.
Through structural changes that propagate from generation to generation of au-
topoietic organisms (“structural drift”) and natural selection, together forming the pro-
cess of evolution, even simple autopoietic organisms have multiple ways of interacting
with their environment. Depending on the nature of that interaction, we can refer to the
areas of the system taking part in it as sensors (surfaces sensitive to external perturba-
tion) or motors (areas capable of producing movement). Internal correlations between
the sensory and motor areas of an organism lead to more complex forms of behaviour
and sensorimotor coordination.
A long history of evolution means that some, more complex, autopoietic systems
have extensive recurrent connectivity networks between their sensory and motor areas
(“nervous systems”). By enabling a huge number of sensory-motor correlations, ner-
vous systems open up increasingly complex behavioural domains. However, as should
be apparent from the definitions given in this section, we repeat that behaviour is not
generated by the nervous system; it simply is expanded in scope by it.
2.1.1.4 Learning
In Section 2.1.1.1, we mentioned that the ontogeny of an autopoietic system is the
history of structural changes it has been through as a result of its interactions with its
environment. These structural changes also apply to an organism’s nervous system, of-
ten leading to changes in the organism’s behaviour. This ontogeny of the nervous sys-
tem and subsequent change in behaviour is learning, defined by Maturana and Varela
(1980, pp. 35-38) as:
1. “A phenomenon of transformation of the nervous system associated to a be-
havioural change that takes place under maintained autopoiesis.”
2. “The change in the domain of possible states the nervous system can adopt,
taking place along the ontogeny of the organism as a result of its interactions.”
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2.1.1.5 Social and communicative behaviour
As we saw, the structure of the nervous system of autopoietic organisms opens up more
complex behavioural domain spaces. One of these behavioural domains is the social
domain. Social phenomena are constituted in the structural coupling of organisms to
form social systems. Interestingly, some kinds of social systems also adhere to the au-
topoietic principles of producing themselves and specifying their own boundaries; this
is what opens up sociological phenomena to autopoietic interpretations (Leydesdorff,
2000).
More relevant for this work, however, is the fact that the social domain enables
another kind of joint behaviour, communication. Communication refers to coordinated
behaviour mutually triggered between autopoietic organisms in a social context; thus,
communicative behaviour only arises in a structural coupling of organisms that are
constitutive parts of a social system. We can distinguish between two forms of com-
municative behaviour: phylogenic and ontogenic.
1. Phylogenic (or innate) communicative behaviour is dependent on structures that
arise during an organism’s developmental process, independently of its particular
ontogeny.
2. Ontogenic (or acquired) communicative behaviour is dependent on the particular
ontogeny of the organism and its history of social interactions.
2.1.1.6 Language
This is where things get more opaque: ontogenic communicative behaviour is defined
as behaviour in the linguistic domain (Fig. 2.2). The linguistic domain forms the basis
for language: the behavioural domain of operations in a linguistic domain that result
in coordination of actions that pertain to the linguistic domain itself.
In other words, language is the linguistic coordination of linguistic coordination of
behaviour, or second-order linguistic coordination. It is important to note that language
is itself a form of behaviour; an action. It is easy to forget this while using the term
“language” as a noun. In order to focus on the character of language as an action,
Maturana and Varela often use the verb term languaging: when we are “languaging”,
we are acting in the behavioural domain of second-order linguistic coordination.
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Figure 2.2: Behaviour in the linguistic domain is defined as ontogenic, communicative
behaviour.
2.1.1.7 Beyond language
Maturana and Varela’s framework does not stop at this point; humans (as autopoietic
systems) are constituted in the domain of language and this domain is used to give
an account of human mental life, including human self-consciousness and experience
(Maturana and Varela, 1980, p. 50, (iv)) . Such an analysis, however, falls outside the
scope of this project so we will not attempt to elaborate on it.
2.1.2 Discussion
In this section, we will attempt to consider the implications that the adoption of an
autopoietic framework has for experimental design, look at some of the most com-
mon criticisms that the theory of autopoiesis faces as a cognitive research project and
expand on the role of language in autopoiesis.
2.1.2.1 Building blocks and explanatory concepts
At various points in the previous section, we pointed out several terms as not intrinsic
to the autopoietic organism, but distinctions that we can only make as observers. This
clear differentiation between intrinsic concepts and ones that depend on our roles as
observers is central to Maturana’s discourse (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p. 8).
This is not just a theoretical concern; it is a design decision that is essential in build-
ing actual experiments and systems that are explicitly non-representational. It allows
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us, as cognitive scientists designing an experiment, to distinguish between building
blocks that we can use to build our systems and explanatory concepts that are useful
in describing the system’s behaviour afterwards, as observers. It is crucial, then, in
the design and building of a system that is consistent with autopoietic principles, not
to conflate our system’s operational domain (where our “building blocks” are found)
with concepts only existing in the domain of descriptions that an observer brings forth.
There are three explanatory concepts that are highly relevant for the work described
in this thesis: representations, information and objects.
Representations: The main explanatory concept that we are trying to target is the
concept of representations. As discussed in Chapter 1, this is a divisive topic
in the cognitive sciences; the explanation and grounding of representations as
a mental construct that interacts with physical matter has proven so far out of
reach.
Maturana writes in the Biology of Language:
Representation, meaning, and description are notions that apply only
and exclusively to the operation of living systems in a consensual
domain [...] for this reason, these notions have no explanatory value
for the characterization of the actual operation of living systems as
autopoietic systems. (Maturana, 1978)
The “consensual domain” of linguistic observers describing a system is where
representations are constituted in the autopoietic view; by actively distinguishing
between “fundamental” building blocks of our system and representations as a
post-linguistic explanatory concept, we avoid the need to provide an account of
representations as a basis of all other cognitive phenomena. At the same time, we
are not outright discarding representations, but only moving them in the space
of post-linguistic cognition as explanatory instead of foundational concepts.
This shift in perspective provides us with a clear path towards the explanation
of symbolic representations as a descriptive concept grounded in language and
the observer; of course, this means that we now have to explain the symbolic
nature of language in a non-representational fashion instead. This switch from
representations to language as the base of symbolic cognition is one of the main
motivations behind the work we will describe in this thesis; we will discuss it
more explicitly later in this chapter.
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Information: In addition to representations, another concept that is often misused in
the study of communicative behaviour in cognitive science is “information”. Of-
ten, information is presented as being a “thing”, an actual material substance that
gets transmitted from agent to agent. However, as Oyama puts it, “Information
is not out there [...], it is a way of talking about certain interactions rather than
their cause or a prescription for them” (Oyama, 2000, p. 197).
Information is always dependent on context and observer; it always corresponds
to a meaningful event, action or utterance and arises within an act of interpreta-
tion (Di Paolo, 1997). As such, it is a descriptive, explanatory concept we use as
observers to make sense of communicative behaviour; not a building block that
plays an operational role in it (Di Paolo, 1997, p. 5). For the purposes of an au-
topoietic account at least, communicative behaviour is grounded in the biological
domain, not in the posterior domain of descriptions information is constituted in.
Objects: More controversial than representation and information, something else that
only appears in the domain of descriptions and language are object concepts:
“As we language, objects arise as aspects of our languaging with others, they do
not exist by themselves.” (Maturana, 2002, p. 28)
Object perception and categorisation might seem like a low-level behaviour, but
as Di Paolo (2009) suggests, object and property distinctions are not basic forms
of perception but rather a “higher form of cognition”, already symbolic and rep-
resentational in nature. It involves regarding an object in a detached matter and
being aware that the same object can have different meanings for other agents.
This view is supported by psychophysical experiments as detailed in Gallagher
(2009).
2.1.2.2 Autopoietic design and experiments
Part of the power of autopoiesis as a theory of cognition comes from its holistic charac-
ter: the same principles that are used to explain the very basic aspects of life, grounded
in biology, are also used to explain behaviour, learning and language. This is appeal-
ing because some of the problems that cognitive science still faces today are circum-
vented, but at the same time it is extremely limiting. Designing an experiment that
is relevant and interesting as a cognitive scientist without having access to descriptive
concepts like “information” and “representations” is already challenging; having to
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use autopoietic systems that “create themselves” and “specify their own boundaries”
seems a rather daunting, if not impossible task.
There are some computer experiments that do actually simulate autopoietic organ-
isms from the ground up, by building systems that are indeed comprised of a network
of processes that build themselves and specify their own boundaries. In fact, a com-
putational model of autopoiesis was provided by Maturana and Varela at the time their
theory was first introduced (Varela et al., 1974), and this low-level research has been
continuing up to the present (Zeleny and Pierre, 1976; Suzuki and Ikegami, 2009; for a
comprehensive review, see McMullin, 2004). These experiments are more relevant in
synthetic biology, however, rather than cognitive science; it seems incredibly difficult
to scale such a system up to research of higher level, cognitively relevant behaviour.
As we saw in Chapter 1 and will repeat in the next section, this is a common issue of
all non-representational research, taken to the extreme.
Autopoietic experiment design however doesn’t necessarily need to start from the
deepest layer of biological processes. We can describe an autopoietic system’s be-
haviour in a certain domain without having to provide a description of their constitution
in the basic molecular, biological domain. According to Maturana:
So, living systems exist in two non-intersecting domains, the domain of
their components as molecular autopoietic systems, and in the domain in
which they operate as organisms (totalities) in a medium that makes them
possible. These two domains do not intersect, the processes that take place
in one cannot be reduced to the processes that take place in the other.
(Maturana, 2002, p. 15)
As long as we follow through the implications and constraints that arise from the
fact that any agents we use in our experiments are constituted in the first domain, and
thus are autopoietic in nature, we can treat them as “black boxes” or “totalities” when
examining their operation in the second domain. What we need to keep in mind then,
when designing a cognitive science experiment that is still faithful to the theory of
autopoiesis, are the following three points:
Agent design: When designing agents, we do not necessarily need to model them as
autopoietic systems. We do however need to treat them as if they were and follow
any implications that this has on the interaction of the agent with its environment.
More specifically, the agents need to be operationally closed: the states they
can be in are determined intrinsically and not dictated by the environment. In
other words, the agent has no “first hand” awareness of its environment but is
structurally coupled to it through motors and sensors.
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Behaviour design: When designing the agents’ behaviour, we need to design from a
systemic perspective, taking into account the agent - environment - task dynam-
ical system. “Behaviour” is not something that is generated by the agent but an
explanatory concept that only arises when we describe, as observers, the whole
system of an agent and its environment: “[...] behaviour as a relational dynam-
ics involves both the organism and the medium in which it exists as a totality”
(Maturana, 2002, p. 13).
System design: When designing the whole system, we need to carefully avoid con-
flating explanatory and operational concepts. When using explanatory concepts,
especially in the design of an agent, we need to be aware of that and be able to
justify their use or explain it using an autopoietic framework.
2.1.2.3 Criticism and challenges
A major problem that autopoietic theory faces as a theory of cognition is the “life-
mind continuity gap” as identified by Froese and Di Paolo (2009). This problem is
not specific to autopoiesis; it is a problem that we identified in Chapter 1 as present
in all non-representational accounts of cognition, usually referred to as the “cognitive
gap” issue. The “gap” here is referring to the non-linear progression from minimal be-
haviour (basic biological processes like bacterial locomotion) and intuitively physical
tasks (such as obstacle avoidance, locomotion and sensory-motor coordination tasks)
to representation-hungry (Clark and Toribio, 1994) cognitive behaviour such as high-
level planning, symbolic thought, abstract reasoning or language.
A widespread view amongst cognitive science researchers is that it simply is not
possible to scale up from the first type of skills to the second one without resorting
to the use of representations as an explanatory mechanism (Clark, 1997; Edelman,
2003). Furthermore, outright discarding representations as a concept is problematic
as phenomenology (and direct conscious experience) show us that we, as humans,
do use representations and therefore a theory of cognition needs to account for this.
Interestingly, however, one of the strengths of autopoiesis is that, as a complete theory,
it provides a framework that can be used to explain representations and higher-level
cognitive phenomena. This framework is the domain of language; we will discuss this
in more detail in a moment.
Another criticism, this time specific to autopoiesis, is that contrary to the theory’s
claim, the theoretical tools it provides are not sufficient to explain a central concept in
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the cognitive sciences, meaning-making (Cuffari et al., 2015, p. 8). The concept, how-
ever, is extensively covered by Maturana (Maturana, 1978; Maturana and Varela, 1980;
Maturana, 2002), who argues against teleological terms in theories of cognition: there
is no meaning or purpose intrinsic to an autopoietic organism. There is only a network
of processes that either produce themselves, operationally closed from the organism’s
environment — and then the organism is alive — or fail to produce themselves or their
own boundary and the organism disperses, not alive or a unity any more. “Meaning”
and “purpose” are distinctions made by an observer about an organism interacting with
its environment, and conflating the operational domain of the organism with the do-
main of descriptions where these distinctions appear would be a methodological error.
As we will see shortly, as humans we can be observers of our own selves and thus
“make” meaning.
Varela, however, in his later work (Varela et al., 2000; Weber, 2002) distanced him-
self from this rejection of teleology. Trying to combine the theory of autopoiesis with
phenomenology, he proposed an account of meaning that is intrinsic to living organ-
isms, who generate it from within in a process called sense-making. This alternative
approach, not shared by Maturana, has flourished into a popular research paradigm in
modern cognitive science, enactivism (Froese, 2011). While intriguing, for the work
of this thesis we will not consider the expanded ideas on meaning-making and adap-
tivity (Di Paolo, 2005) that the framework of enactivism provides. As Kravchenko
(2011) notes, by introducing teleology in the mechanistic framework of autopoiesis,
we are risking a step back towards computational theories of the mind and all of the
methodological and theoretical issues those entail. A purely mechanistic account like
Maturana’s autopoiesis is more restrictive but more principled in its explanatory power.
2.1.2.4 On the role of language
The powerful influence of language on human cognition is well-recognised; it is often
put forward as a defining aspect of the human species that sets us apart from animals
(Becker, 1991) and as a very useful cognitive tool, used not only for communicative
purposes, but also —in both verbal and gestural form— to help the speaker in cogni-
tive tasks (Goldin-Meadow, 1999). Clark (1998) eloquently describes it as an external
artefact that “augments human computation”. In autopoietic theory, however, language
plays an even more essential role in explaining human cognition. In the Tree of Knowl-
edge, Maturana writes: “We work out our lives in a mutual linguistic coupling because
we are constituted in language in a continuous becoming that we bring forth with oth-
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ers.” (Maturana and Varela, 1992, ch. 9)
What this means is that in addition to existing as molecular autopoietic systems,
constituted in the biological domain, humans are in parallel constituted in the domain
of language. We cannot explain human cognition without taking that fact into account:
language changes everything by allowing us to become observers, including observing
our own behaviour and thus recursively interacting with it. Meaning, representations,
objects and categories, information: all of these concepts are constituted in the domain
of descriptions that language generates.
The constitution of meaning and symbolic representation in the linguistic domain
has distinct similarities to the Vygotskian “Outside-Inside” principle, according to
which language is not externalised thought, but rather symbolic thought is internalised
language. According to Vygotsky’s observations, developing children do not initially
have access to inner speech or language of thought. Only after access to language do
they start “playing out” symbolic thought, first only in action and subsequently inter-
nalised. Evidence from deaf signers points out that naming and symbol use are not
inherent human behaviour; names, labels and symbols always come from the outside
(Donald, 2000, p. 14).
In this way, language becomes an entity of its own: a bootstrapping system, an ex-
ternal representational framework. It is important, however, to keep in mind that in the
first place, the act of language is an action, a social behaviour that living agents take
part in. If we want to be able to use the explanatory power of language in a cognitive
theory, we must be able to explain, in biological terms, where the behaviour of lan-
guaging came from in the first place. This is an area where Maturana’s autopoietic the-
ory is left wanting: languaging is only described as an external observation—linguistic
coordination of linguistic coordination—but very little is said about how languaging
as a behaviour historically evolved in autopoietic agents (Cuffari et al., 2015).
There are a few attempts at autopoietically informed approaches to linguistics
(Kravchenko, 2004, 2011; Bottineau, 2008), but again none of them look at the prob-
lem of how a linguistic system evolved in human history. This is exactly the question,
however, that the field of evolutionary linguistics is trying to answer. If we want to
begin providing an answer of what an autopoietic view of language evolution would
look like, this is where we need to look next.
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2.2 Experimental Semiotics
The investigation of the origins of language and of the evolution of symbols and lin-
guistic structure is a very important part of language research. The respective field,
evolutionary linguistics, has been dominated for a long time by nativist accounts that
attribute most aspects of language, including its structure and grammar, to biological
evolution and the organisation of the human brain (Pinker and Bloom, 1990). A major
argument in favour of this view, originally formalised by Gold (1967) and popularised
in linguistics by (Chomsky, 1992) is the poverty of the stimulus argument (Berwick
et al., 2011) according to which the amount and type of linguistic data developing in-
fants are subject to is not enough for them to infer the inherent grammar of language.
Nevertheless, not only do children still learn grammar, but they do so in a surprisingly
quick and robust fashion. This fact, according to nativists, means that universal features
of grammar (or language structure) must be innate and as such a product of biological
evolution. Some mutation in one of our ancestors must have introduced the capability
for symbolic thought; this mutation, being of significant evolutionary advantage, was
selected for and spread through our species. According to this view, then, language is
the externalisation of this internal symbolic “language of thought”; the basic structure
common to all natural languages (referred to as Universal Grammar) stems from the
innate rules of symbolic thought.
This explanation of language is obviously not compatible with non-representational
accounts of cognition. Even worse, it is in direct opposition with the view of language
that we put forward in Section 2.1.2.4 according to which language is an external
symbolic system that gets internalised (as opposed to an internal system that gets ex-
ternalised). Furthermore, it seems that it is also not compatible with more recent exper-
imental evidence about language acquisition (Elman, 1998; Pullum and Scholz, 2002;
Zuidema, 2003). Accordingly, the field of evolutionary linguistics, once dominated
by nativist accounts, is steadily moving towards explaining the evolution of language
using processes beyond biological evolution alone. Such processes include joint action
in a social context (Di Paolo, 1997; Steels, 2012), cultural transmission (Smith et al.,
2003; Oudeyer, 2005) and self-organisation (Oudeyer, 2013).
Many of the approaches mentioned above are collectively referred to as forming
the field of experimental semiotics: an investigation of “the emergence of novel forms
of communication in the laboratory” (Galantucci, 2009; Galantucci and Garrod, 2011).
The field’s focus on experiments leads to an appealing ability to flesh out and test spe-
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cific hypotheses; the focus on novel forms of communications means that experimental
semiotics approaches are easily applicable to AI and robotics research. Furthermore,
the study of communication in the context of its use —joint action— is especially rel-
evant for the aim of this project: the investigation of the evolution of language using
an autopoietic framework.
In this section we are going to examine two of the most influential models in the
experimental semiotics field: the Iterated Learning Model (Kirby, 2002b) and the Talk-
ing Heads experiments (Steels, 2003). The Iterated Learning Model (“ILM”) uses the
fact that language is culturally transmitted from generation to generation in order to ex-
plain how important structural properties of language can evolve without the need for a
“language organ” in the speaker’s brain; the Talking Heads experiments use a number
of agents taking part in language games to study how meaning is created, coordinated
and assigned to symbols in a social context.
2.2.1 Iterated Learning
The main idea behind the Iterated Learning Model (Kirby, 2002b) is that the features of
the natural languages that we use cannot be fully determined only from the biological
cognitive basis of language in humans. Language is in itself a system that evolves, and
this evolution shapes its structure (grammar) and its features. Instead of evolution by
biological reproduction, languages evolve by being culturally transmitted from gen-
eration to generation of linguistic learners and teachers. Instead of natural selection,
languages are selected for their learnability to young, developing minds. Brighton
and Kirby (2005) sum up the ideas behind Iterated Learning in the following three
principles:
Principle 1 (Innateness hypothesis): This principle states that the cognitive basis for
language in humans is biological. Biological evolution has equipped humans
with a number of skills, not necessarily specific to language, that allowed the
emergence of language.
Principle 2 (Situatedness): This principle states that the cognitive basis mentioned
in Principle 1 underdetermines the structure of language. In order to have a
complete explanation of language structure, we must also take into account the
historical process of language evolution through cultural transmission and selec-
tion.
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Principle 3 (Function independence): This principle states that we do not need to
take into account the function or use of language in order to explain at least
some of its structural features.
Another important aspect of the ILM methodology is the enforcement of a bot-
tleneck on language transmission. The presence of this bottleneck mirrors one of the
aspects of the poverty of the stimulus argument mentioned above: the fact that when
learning language, learners are exposed to only a part of all possible grammatically
correct sentences. The bottleneck is however doubly important: it also puts a selective
pressure on languages to be learnable. According to the ILM, this pressure for learn-
ability is exactly what leads to the evolution of the structure of language, leading to the
eloquent statement that “the poverty of the stimulus solves the poverty of the stimulus”
(Zuidema, 2003).
Finally, ILM experiments do not provide language learners with feedback on their
use of language. Developing language learners have no negative feedback, so no in-
dication of when they uttered a non-grammatical sentence (Zuidema, 2003, pp. 1-2);
by not including any linguistic feedback, the ILM makes sure it conforms to the con-
straints of the “poverty of the stimulus” argument.
2.2.1.1 Simulation experiments
The initial ILM experiments were performed using computer modelling and simula-
tion. An overview of early simulation-based ILM is given in Kirby (2002b); a simula-
tion model that produces compositional languages is presented in Smith et al. (2003).
Smith et al.’s model has the following components:
1. A meaning space: This is a collection of meanings, each meaning being rep-
resented as a point in a discrete multi-dimensional space. A single meaning
can have multiple components; this allows the model to encode structure in the
meaning space.
2. A signal space: This is a collection of signals, strings of characters drawn from
a specified alphabet. Each of the meanings is initially assigned a random signal.
3. A number of agents. Each agent is modelled as a network with two sets of nodes;
one set represents meanings, either complete (with all their components) or in-
complete (where some components are missing). The other set represents sig-
nals. All meaning-nodes are fully connected to all signal-nodes and vice versa.
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4. Learning happens by changing the weights of the connections between the nodes
that correspond to the meaning-signal pair observed.
5. Production of a symbol, when prompted with a certain meaning, happens by
picking the meaning-signal pair with the highest sum of weights from the agent’s
network.
A similar production mechanism called the obverter method was also used in pre-
vious ILM computational models (for example Kirby, 2002b). Kirby is more explicit
about the assumptions of the production mechanism, stating that “the idea behind ob-
verter is for a communicative agent to produce signals that maximize the chance of
the hearer understanding the correct meaning” (Kirby, 2002b, p.124) and that “the
speaker’s own mapping approximates that of the hearer” (Kirby, 2002b, p.125).
Returning to Smith et al.’s model, the simulation world includes a number of learn-
ing agents and a number of teaching agents. Teachers produce a specified percentage
of the whole language for learners to learn; by changing that percentage, a bottle-
neck of varying width can be introduced in the system. After a specified number of
learning events, learners become teachers themselves and new learning agents are in-
troduced in the simulation world. The population number is kept stable by removing
an “old” teacher for each new learner introduced. By running the simulation for a num-
ber of agent generations, the initial (random) language evolves; the resulting language
can then be checked for elements of structure. The specific structure of interest in
this experiment was compositionality. (A complex structure is compositional when its
meaning is a function of the meanings of its parts; Smith et al., 2003, p. 372. Natural
languages are compositional, as for example the meaning of the utterance “come here”
is a function of the meanings of its parts, “come” and “here”.) The degree of composi-
tionality was measured by the correlation of two distances: the distance between two
meanings and the distance between their paired signals.
In Fig. 2.3, we can see the mean results of 1000 simulation repetitions for two dif-
ferent experimental cases. In the first case, there is no bottleneck: each teaching event
includes all of the language pairs. The result (Fig. 2.3a) is that most of the resulting
languages are holistic: meaning-signal pairs with similar “signals” do not necessarily
have similar “meanings”, so the meaning and signal distances are not correlated, re-
sulting in low compositionality scores. In the second case, there is a narrow bottleneck:
only 40% of the total language pairs are produced by the teaching agent. The result
(Fig. 2.3b) is very different; a significant percentage of the resulting languages are
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Figure 2.3: Results for the ILM simulation experiment in Smith et al. (2003). A simulation
without a bottleneck (a) results in almost all languages being holistic; a simulation with
a bottleneck (b) results in most languages being compositional, especially when the
meaning space is structured.
compositional. Furthermore, when the meaning space is structured (bold continuous
line) this is the case for almost all languages.
A number of simulation ILM experiments (Griffiths and Kalish, 2005, 2007; Kirby
et al., 2015) also use mathematical (Bayesian) models of transmission chains instead
of simulated agents.
2.2.1.2 Human experiments
In addition to computer modelling experiments, the ILM has been applied to human
experiments in the lab (Kirby et al., 2008). The participants were asked to learn an
alien language; as in the simulation experiments, the language is as a set of associa-
tions between a meaning space and a signal space. The experimental design was the
following:
• Each meaning was a picture of an object with a certain shape, colour and move-
ment, creating a three-dimensional meaning space.
• Each signal was a label (a text string). The initial values for these labels were
random.
• The language, a set of pictures of objects (meanings) and labels (signals), was
initially randomly divided in two sets: SEEN and UNSEEN. Participants were
first trained on the language using the SEEN set only; after this training period,
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Figure 2.4: First ILM human experiment. Error rate decreases (a) and measure of
structure increases (b) as the language is transmitted from generation to generation.
However, the resulting language is not expressive; the same signals are used for multi-
ple meanings (c) (adapted from Kirby et al., 2008).
they were tested on all sets, both SEEN and UNSEEN. This models the bottle-
neck aspect of language learning.
• Finally, the language produced by each participant was randomly divided once
more into SEEN and UNSEEN sets and used to train the next participant. The
participants were not aware of this; this both models the cultural transmission
of language from generation to generation and adheres to the “no feedback”
requirement that we mentioned earlier.
An analysis of the error rates of the participants as well as a measure of the structure
of the resulting language (based on the correlation between the similarity of signals
and the similarity of meanings, compared to the equivalent correlation of a random
language) can be seen in Fig. 2.4a and 2.4b. We can see that with each successive
generation, the error rate tends to decrease and the measure of structure tends to in-
crease, indicating that the language becomes progressively more structured and at the
same time more learnable. On a closer analysis of the resulting language, however,
it turns out that the structure that has evolved is “systematic under-specification”; the
language expressivity has collapsed and the same signals are used for multiple related
meanings (Fig. 2.4c). This allowed learning to successfully generalise the language in
the presence of a bottleneck.
Kirby et al. consequently designed a second experiment identical to the first ex-
cept for the addition of an extra (hidden) constraint: after each participant produced a
language and before that language was used to train the next participant, any change
that led to under-specifying languages was discarded; in that way, no two meanings
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Figure 2.5: Second ILM human experiment; this time, language expressivity is retained
using an extra hidden constraint. Once more, error rate decreases (a) and measure of
structure increases (b) as the language is transmitted from generation to generation.
This time, the resulting language is compositional (c) (adapted from Kirby et al., 2008).
with the same label were presented to the participants, ensuring that language expres-
sivity was always maintained. The results of this second experiment were similar to
the first one: with each successive generation, the language becomes more learnable
and more structured (Fig. 2.5a, 2.5b). This time, however, the resulting language is
highly compositional (Fig. 2.5c).
2.2.1.3 Further experiments
Thanks to the power of transmission chains, the Iterated Learning approach has led
to a very fruitful research programme. Since the experiments detailed in the previous
sections, there have been a plethora of others (for a recent review, see Tamariz and
Kirby, 2016). We will mention some below.
Graphical signals: A series of studies (Garrod et al., 2007; Fay et al., 2010) use
graphical instead of symbolic communication systems. In contrast to the pre-
vious Iterated Learning experiments we presented, the transmission chains in
this case are “horizontal” (intragenerational) instead of “vertical” (intergener-
ational). This means that the chains do not involve learning episodes between
trained and naive individuals, but repeated interactions amongst a population of
pairs of participants. These pairs were asked to communicate a certain meaning
using drawings; while initially the variation in the drawings used was very high,
after a few episodes of transmission the drawings converged to those that were
simpler and more abstract, an indication of a move from iconic to symbolic signs
(Garrod et al., 2007, p. 983).
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In studies with smaller populations, Fay et al. (2010) reported similar findings:
the drawings the pairs used to communicate became progressively more sym-
bolic (harder to understand for observers not belonging to the population) as
opposed to iconic (closely reflecting the meaning to be communicated). A char-
acteristic example of this switch from iconic to symbolic for the concept of “Brad
Pitt” is shown in Fig. 2.6.
Theisen-White et al. (2011) expanded on this paradigm by using pairs that were
trying to communicate a meaning with drawings and then passing the result-
ing communication systems from generation to generation of pairs. With this
integration of vertical and horizontal transmission, the drawings used to com-
municate started exhibiting structure.
Continuous signals: Instead of using discrete signals for meaning communication,
Verhoef et al. (2011, 2012, 2014) used continuous signals produced by a slide
whistle without any meaning association. The use of whistling instead of human
speech allowed for a continuous medium while also minimising the impact of
speech and language experience. Each participant listened to a set of 12 whis-
tle sounds and had to memorise and play them back; this output was then used
as the input set for the next participant (after being filtered for “no duplicate
whistles” as an artificially enforced measure of expressivity). After a chain of
10 generations, the initially structureless whistling space became structured. As
12 different structureless continuous sounds are very difficult to remember and
reproduce, participants make use of basic “building blocks” which they combine
in different ways (Verhoef et al., 2014). Once more, evolutionary pressures for
learnability and expressivity combined with a transmission chain lead to struc-
ture from an initially structureless space.
Animal experiments: Finally, a few studies focus on cultural transmission chains in
non-human animals. Horner et al. (2006) set up an experiment with a population
of chimpanzees. In the experiment, an initial model from the population was
trained to use one of two methods (“lifting” or “sliding”) to retrieve a reward
from a box. A second chimpanzee observed them retrieving the reward from the
box a number of times, then was given access to the box to try and retrieve the
reward themselves; if they were successful, they served as a model for the next
chimpanzee. Repeating this procedure leads to a chain of learning by observation
from generation to generation. Horner et al. found that the initial behaviour was
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Figure 2.6: The drawing representing “Brad Pitt” in a pictorial communication game,
initially iconic, becomes symbolic after some generations of horizontal transmission
(adapted from Fay et al., 2010).
transmitted along this chain with high fidelity, showcasing a transmission chain
in a population of chimpanzees that is very similar to the chains used in the ILM
experiments (Fig. 2.7).
Claidière et al. (2014) used a population of baboons in a more traditional “ILM-
style” chain. An initial model was shown a set of 50 random patterns that they
had to reproduce on a grid of buttons (with a reward for successful or close
to successful reproductions). Each animal’s output patterns were then used as
inputs for the next animal, with the process repeated for 12 generations. As
was the case in the experiments we detailed in Section 2.2.1.2, both the rate of
successful pattern reproduction and the measure of structure in the transmitted
patterns increased by the end of the chain. This provides support to the claim
that it is not only human-specific biological traits that determine the structure of
language: the process of Iterated Learning, even in non-human animals, leads to
structure in initial unstructured stimuli.
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Figure 2.7: Two cultural transmission chains in chimpanzees (Horner et al., 2006). An
initial model (GG, ER) was trained to use one of two methods (“lifting” in chain FS1,
“sliding” in chain FS2) to retrieve a reward from a box. A second chimpanzee observed
them retrieving the reward a number of times, then allowed to try and retrieve the reward
themselves. Repetition of this procedure led to the maintenance of the initial model’s
behaviour for 6 generations in cultural transmission chains.
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2.2.2 Talking Heads
The approach the ILM takes to studying the evolution of language is often called a ver-
tical approach, referring to its focus on the transmission of language from generation
to generation. The respective horizontal approach would then refer to the transmission
and use of language for joint action within the same generation of a society (Theisen-
White et al., 2011). One of the research projects that focuses on this approach is Luc
Steels’ Talking Heads (Steels, 2003).
Luc Steels’ project, instead of studying the evolution of language structure, models
the grounding, self-organisation and evolution of meaning in a society of agents taking
part in “language games”. In these games, populations of agents (robotic or simu-
lated) interact with their environment and each other by making use of one or more
sensorimotor systems. In their mutual interactions, the agents take turns producing or
receiving speech signals in order to take part in joint action with specific scripts. One
example of a language game is the guessing game (Steels, 2001). In this game, the
speaker tries to draw the listener’s attention to an object in the environment by, for
example, pointing at it and “naming” it (producing the symbol they have associated
with it).
Language in the Talking Heads experiments is, once more, an association between
meanings (called here “representations”) and signals (called here “symbols”). In ad-
dition to these, there must be a way to rate the associations; language is then a set
of triplets (< r,s,k >: representation, symbol, past score). After each iteration of the
game, a feedback loop updates the rating of associations. The steps to play the game
are the following (taken from Steels, 2001):
1. Shared attention: The speaker somehow draws the listener’s attention to a topic.
2. Speaker behaviour: The speaker conceptualises the topic (for example, if the en-
vironment only has one blue item, item colour is a good way to refer to the topic)
and creates a representation. The symbol s that corresponds to the representation
formed with the highest score is the best word to communicate; it is transformed
into a speech signal.
3. Listener behaviour: The listener receives the signal (and symbol) and looks up
all associations; if there is no association, a new word is created. Otherwise, the
listener applies all representations to see if any of them yield a unique topic; if
found, this is the topic the listener selects.
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4. Feedback: the listener’s selected topic and the speaker’s original topic are com-
pared; if they match, association scores for the triplets selected are increased,
otherwise decreased. If there is no match, the process is repeated (with the de-
creased scores).
5. If either of the agents fail to conceptualise the scene, a concept-acquisition algo-
rithm is triggered.
The result of the guessing game and similar experiments is the replication of a num-
ber of features of natural languages, like homonymy (Wellens et al., 2008), synonymy
and ambiguity of meaning (Steels and Kaplan, 1999). The Talking Heads experiments
are quite adjacent in spirit to embodied cognition models, as they adopt a “whole sys-
tems” approach to the study of the evolution of language. As the focus is on the
evolution of meaning, the syntax and structure of symbols are arbitrarily instantiated
and do not evolve; for this reason they are a good candidate for combination studies
with ILM models (Vogt, 2005).
While we have only outlined one of the language games (the “Guessing Game”),
the Talking Heads experiments were not limited to that. The “Discrimination Game”,
for example, focused on researching mechanisms of the emergence of categorisation,
while the “Naming Game” studied how a certain meaning is grounded in an external
object. Furthermore, these original experiments have since branched out to multiple re-
search directions, making use of more complex grammar constructions, more powerful
physical robots or studying the evolution of language syntax and structure in addition
to the evolution of meaning. For a comprehensive picture of this very rich research
program, see Steels (2015).
Despite the focus on joint action and a more systemic approach compared to the
Iterated Learning models, the Talking Heads experiments are less suited for an au-
topoietic exploration of the evolution of language. The reason for that is that the main
concern of these experiments is to explain the evolution of meaning; as we saw in
Section 2.1.2.4, this is a sensitive area for both Maturana’s original autopoietic theory
and the more recent enactivist approaches. The account of meaning used here is not
compatible with either approach. For this reason, in the rest of this chapter we will
focus on discussing a combination of autopoietic principles with Iterated Learning.
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2.2.3 Discussion
What we can see from both the simulation experiments and the human experiments is
that the ILM presents a convincing argument against the claim that language structure
is innate. The poverty of the stimulus argument, one of the main arguments in favour
of the nativist view, is turned on its head as the experiments show that compositionality
evolves in language because of the poverty of the stimulus and not in spite of it.
This result, in addition to being very significant for evolutionary linguistics, seems
to suggest a tentative first step in the attempt to bridge the “cognitive gap” to language
that we discussed previously. In the rest of this section, we will try to detail why this is
the case by drawing attention to the differing approaches to “language” in the theory of
autopoiesis and the Iterated Learning model; and expand on the challenges that occur
from attempting to combine the two approaches.
2.2.3.1 Language in Autopoiesis and the ILM
Language is at the same time,
(L1) A behaviour that agents take part in (“languaging” in autopoietic terminology),
(L2) An external system of symbols and meanings that agents use in their languaging
behaviour, transmitted from generation to generation of linguistic agents.
Autopoiesis places most of its explanatory focus on language as an action (L1):
“linguistic coordination of linguistic coordination”. An agent languages when they
use learned communicative behaviour (see section 2.1.1.5) to coordinate their commu-
nicative behaviour itself. This self reference 1 is what leads to the rise of the observer
and post-linguistic phenomena; it also implicitly points to the nature of language as an
external system (L2).
What autopoiesis does not attempt to explain, however, is the transition from first-
order communicative behaviour to second-order, self-referential languaging (with the
features of language as we know them). In other words, it takes no part in the debate
about the evolution of language despite the fact that, as we saw, language is a pivotal
component of autopoietic theory. This is where Iterated Learning, covering exactly
this explanatory gap, is of particular importance for the theory of autopoiesis; the goal
1This is a form of recursion, albeit not in the way that this term is used in linguistics — see for
example Chomsky (2014).
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being that with a proper selection of task and an initially random, non-self-referential
language, we can show that a language with self-referential features evolves.
Iterated Learning, however, approaches language from the viewpoint of an exter-
nal observer (L2), without placing too much focus on language as a social action or
on what the action of languaging is used for (“function independence” principle, see
section 2.2.1). In order to even take a first step towards the goal we stated, then, we
need to re-frame the experimental setup that Iterated Learning experiments use to one
that is compatible with the constraints that we detailed in Sections 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.2.2.
This presents a number of challenges that we will try to detail below.
2.2.3.2 Choice of working domain
The most obvious problematic point in this re-framing is that in the ILM, “language” is
defined as a set of symbol to meaning associations. This definition of language, while
useful for the purpose of most ILM experiments, is provided in a domain of descrip-
tions, not in an operational domain. It originates from an analysis of language from
the point of view of an external observer, and since we want to explain how language
evolved in societies of agents in the first place, we need to work in an operational do-
main. In such a domain, language is not a collection of words and meanings but a
specific behaviour that agents take part in, “languaging”. A number of other perceived
incompatibilities are mostly just extensions of this choice of domain to work in.
2.2.3.3 Function independence and systemic approach
According to the “function independence” principle, we can explain some of the struc-
tural features of language without taking into account what that language is used for.
In the ILM experiments that we detailed, there is no definition of an explicit purpose or
function of language. There are two problems with this approach, the first being that it
is not compatible with the systemic perspective that we adopted in Section 2.1.2.2, that
states that any explanation of behaviour must take into account the interplay of agent
and environment, as that domain is where behaviour is defined as a term. If we want
to examine any aspect of languaging as a behaviour, we need to take into account what
function that behaviour accomplishes.
The second problem is that regardless of our autopoietic perspective, agents using
language are always performing an action. That is true for any Iterated Learning ex-
periments as well: taking part in an ILM experiment is a joint action between a subject
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and an experimenter, and the use of language in this joint action context cannot lack a
function. In most ILM experiments, this hidden function is “reference”.
In the case of the human experiments, the language game played by the participants
is clearly one of reference: they are asked to look at pictures and learn (then produce) a
caption for them. Also, the extra constraint of preserving language expressivity used in
the experiments we detailed is an inherently functional constraint: an under-specifying
language is not useful in the sense that it cannot function for a linguistic game of ref-
erence. In the same way, the “obverter function” used in the simulation experiments
is directly modelling the use of language for object reference. We see then that de-
spite the “function independence” principle, language does have a function in the ILM
experiments, even if that function is implicit rather than explicit. Additionally, the ex-
ternally enforced constraint on expressivity in that experiment has its roots in the use
of language as a tool for object reference.
The importance of expressivity as a functional constraint is also highlighted in
Kirby et al. (2015), which explicitly adds dyadic communication (and thus, a functional
expressivity pressure) to Iterated Learning experiments. Using either vertical transmis-
sion chains of agent pairs (leading to high learnability pressures on the language the
pair uses to communicate) or closed groups of horizontal transmission (leading to low
learnability pressures), Kirby et al. examine the effect of learnability and expressivity
pressures on the structure of the resulting language.
The results from that study show that in both simulation and human models, the
emergence of compositionality in language requires a pressure for compressibility or
learnability (coming from the process of inter-generational chain transmission) and a
pressure for expressivity (coming from the functional need of intra-generational com-
munication). Only one or the other pressure is not enough, and leads to either un-
structured holistic languages (one-to-one symbol to meaning correspondence) or func-
tionally useless degenerate languages (one-to-all symbol to meaning correspondence).
This makes one of the implicit assumptions of the initial ILM experiment we reviewed
earlier (the functional need for expressivity) explicit, and in doing so establishes its
importance for the emergence of compositionality.
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2.2.3.4 Object reference
Object reference as the function of language is directly tied to the view of language
as a collection of meaning and symbol pairs, as meanings are object representations
in the agents’ minds. Transferring these pairs from generation to generation is trans-
ferring information about the language, completing the list of “forbidden” explanatory
concepts we gave in Section 2.1.2.1.
However, trying to replace reference as the function of language is problematic. As
it is hard to define what a pre-referential language would look like, almost all of the It-
erated Learning experiments involve some sort of reference. Verhoef et al. (2012) is an
exception to this rule, as that experiment uses signals without any meaning association;
as the initially continuous signals go through transmission chains, the signal space be-
comes structured and combinatorial. However, the resulting combinatorial structure is
conceded to have more to do with human biases rather than any functional pressure, so
an autopoietic account of this phenomenon needs to both precisely know what those
biases are and explain them in operational terms.
A more realistic and theoretically compatible first step for an autopoietic explana-
tion of language evolution would instead draw inspiration from the animal experiments
we mentioned in Section 2.2.1.3. Indeed, a chain of behavioural transmission like the
one shown in Horner et al. (2006) is not necessarily based on object reference and has
no explanatory need of concepts of meaning or representation. We still need (mini-
mally) two different behaviours and an account of learning; we will discuss these in
Chapter 3.
Another potentially relevant experiment, this time from the field of evolutionary
robotics, comes from Quinn (2001), who studied the evolution of communication in
simple robotic agents that had no pre-set communication channels. For his experiment,
Quinn used pairs of simulated Khepera robots, who have a circular body with a number
of short-range proximity sensors and two wheels for differential movement. The robots
were placed in a random orientation but in range of each other, and needed to move a
certain distance in a limited time while staying in range. This means that they had to
move in the same direction; however, accomplishing this is not trivial. If one of the
agents takes initiative and moves first in a certain direction, the two agents end up out
of range and fail the task. Furthermore, as the agents are circular, there is no way to
determine the other agent’s orientation.
Quinn used genetic algorithms to evolve a neural network controller for the robots
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Figure 2.8: Simple physical task for the evolution of communication without a dedicated
communication channel (Quinn, 2001).
that came up with a solution to this task, shown in Fig. 2.8. The solution involved the
following steps:
1. The two agents start rotating counter-clockwise, until one of them “sees” the
other agent in their frontal proximity sensor. In the scenario shown in Fig. 2.8,
this is agent B.
2. Agent B approaches agent A and remains close, “jiggling” back and forth.
3. Agent A “sees” agent B jiggling in their front sensor.
4. Agent A reverses their direction and starts moving. Agent B follows agent A.
What is happening here is intriguing: a simple communication system has evolved
between the two agents. A formerly non-communicative behaviour (“jiggling”) is
transformed into a signal that essentially means “I am waiting for you to lead and I
will follow”; this allows the two agents, completely identical otherwise, to break the
symmetry and adopt a specific role, thus escaping a deadlock situation and solving the
task.
Quinn’s experiments point us to an example of a task that, similar to the chim-
panzee retrieval task of Horner et al. (2006), does not make explicit use of represen-
tations, meaning or object concepts. Again, we will come back to the discussion of
a similar task that we will use for our experiments in Chapter 3. It bears clarifying
that by using a simple, non-referential task we are not making an attempt to explain
any of the structural features of language. Instead, we are only trying to show that it
is possible to build a cultural transmission chain on a non-representational substrate.
As we saw in Section 2.2.1, cultural transmission chains are of paramount importance
for explaining universal features of language; with an autopoietic implementation of
such a chain we would be opening the way for a more thorough non-representational
exploration of the evolution of linguistic systems.
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2.3 Summary & claim
So far, we can summarise our argument as it appears in Chapters 1 and 2 as follows:
1. As opposed to the view of cognition as computation, non-representational cog-
nitive science sidesteps the “grounding problem” that the traditional approach
faces and offers a bottom-up, systemic way of examining cognitive phenomena.
Within the non-representational camp, autopoiesis is a biologically grounded
theory of cognition particularly attractive because of its completeness and ex-
planatory power.
2. Autopoiesis (and non representational cognitive science in general) struggle with
scaling up to higher level cognitive behaviour such as planning and conscious
thought.
3. In autopoietic theory in particular, language could help bridge the gap to rep-
resentational cognition as the explanatory concepts of meaning, reference and
representation are constituted in the domain of language. However, a major
challenge remains because the emergence and evolution of language as a system
still needs to be explained without having access to these explanatory concepts.
4. The Iterated Learning framework provides a powerful account of language evo-
lution through cultural transmission while removing the focus from the agent
and the brain in a way that holds promise for non-representational accounts of
cognition.
5. Cultural transmission of behaviour is a fitting first step for an autopoietic explo-
ration of language evolution through Iterated Learning. While being a prereq-
uisite (and forming the basis) for Iterated Learning, it also does not require an
account of meaning or reference.
Our claim then can be presented as follows:
It is possible to build a system that is both,
1. Consistent with the non-representational, autopoietic design princi-
ples that we outlined in Section 2.1.2.2 and,
2. Able to support a chain of cultural transmission of behaviour.




In Section 2.3, we made the claim that we can build a behaviour transmission chain
on a system that is based on autopoietic principles. In this chapter, we will attempt
to detail the design of such a system. In essence, three components are required for
a transmission chain: a number of agents (the units between which transmission hap-
pens), an account of learning (the process of transmission itself) and a task (which
determines the behaviour to be transmitted). These components will be covered in the
first part of this chapter, while in the second part we will describe the overall design of
component interconnection and the experimental setup.
3.1 Task design
3.1.1 Animal task
The starting point for a task that is simple, yet ecologically valid and proven to be
transmissible in the wild comes from the chimpanzee cultural transmission experiment
described in Horner et al. (2006). As we mentioned in section 2.2.1.3, each of the
chimpanzees in that experiment had the task to retrieve a reward from a closed box
which could be opened in two different ways. The fact that there were two possible,
equally valid ways to solve the retrieval task is important because it means that it
is possible to track the transmission and maintenance of each behaviour in cultural
chains.
The problem with using a similar task for our system is that this is a single agent
task: it relies on observational learning rather than any form of joint action. If we want
our system to be a “first step” in an autopoietic account of language evolution, or more
generally to be relevant for the study of the evolution of systems of communication,
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we need to pick a joint action task that is potentially communicative.
3.1.2 Robot task
Such a task — both joint action based and potentially communicative — is used in
the evolution of communication experiments (Quinn, 2001) that we detailed in section
2.2.3.4. The robots in that experiment had to solve the task of moving their combined
center of mass in a maximum distance while not losing track of each other. Since
each robot had no way to sense the other robot’s orientation, the solution to this task
(found by a genetic search algorithm) involved the evolution of signalling behaviour
between the two robots that allowed them to adopt different leader and follower roles
and successfully move together.
The problem with Quinn’s specific task for our scenario is twofold. Firstly, it in-
volves evolutionary search, not learning algorithms; the robot’s signalling behaviour
is completely innate and evolved. The time scales we are looking at for cultural trans-
mission chains are not phylogenetic but ontogenetic (or rather, “glossogenetic”: see
Kirby, 2002b, p. 122): we want learning, not evolution. Secondly, it only involves a
single behaviour and as we saw we need at least two different behaviours to examine
their cultural transmission in chains.
3.1.3 Task criteria
Stepping back, we are looking for a task that meets the following criteria:
Joint action: The task needs to be based on joint action and coordination, so that it is
potentially communicative and relevant to the study of linguistic systems.
Pre-communicative basis: The task needs to be based on pre-existing actions that
are not necessarily communicative or even social in nature; this adds to the eco-
logical plausibility of our system as it provides a potential explanation for the
evolution of communication (Quinn, 2001, p. 358).
Transmissible: The task needs to provide some kind of feedback so that it is learnable
(and teachable), so transmissible from generation to generation. Note that this
does not contradict the avoidance of linguistic feedback that we mentioned in
Section 2.2.1; task feedback is unavoidable and present in most learning, includ-
ing human language acquisition.
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Figure 3.1: Two agents in the Left/Right dancing task. If both agents turn in the same
direction (a, b) then they “dance” and successfully complete the task; if they turn in
opposite directions (c, d) then they crash and fail the task.
Not binary: There must be more than one way or behaviour that allow our agents to
succeed at the task; this is what makes it possible to examine a potential cultural
transmission chain.
Potentially evolvable: Ideally, we would like the task to create the potential for an
evolvable communication system; while this is not strictly necessary for a cul-
tural transmission chain, it would mean that the task is complex enough to enable
future investigation of the evolution of linguistic structure.
3.1.4 L/R dancing task
The Left/Right dancing task is a very simple joint action task that fulfils all of the
above criteria. It is based on the non-communicative action of a single agent “turning
around” an object, either counter-clockwise (“Left” direction) or clockwise (“Right”
direction). This simple action, when put in a joint context by replacing the object with
another agent, has a number of possible outcomes depending on whether each agent is
dancing “Left” or “Right”, as shown in Fig. 3.1.
If both agents, after they detect each other in proximity, try to turn around each
other in the same direction (L-L or R-R), then they successfully “dance”, either stati-
cally or in a moving spiral, depending on the turning behaviour implementation (Fig.
3.1a, b). If they try to turn around each other in opposite directions (L-R or R-L), then
Chapter 3. Design 42
they crash, failing the task (Fig. 3.1c, d). In essence, this is a physical, joint action
implementation of an “XNOR” logical operation, only returning “success” if both of
its inputs are the same.
The L/R dancing task fits the first four criteria we presented in the previous section
(3.1.3): it is a joint action task between two agents, based on a behaviour (“turning
around”) that is pre-communicative; it is transmissible, as it can be learned by con-
necting the success or failure at performing the task with a reward; and it is not binary
(completed or not completed), as it can be completed in more than one way (Left-Left
or Right-Right turning both lead to successful dancing).
3.1.4.1 Relevance to language
As described, the L/R dancing task does not use signals or communication: it is a
purely coordinative task. Our goal, as stated in section 2.3, involves taking a first step
towards an autopoietic account of language evolution; is a non-communicative task of
coordination even relevant as such a first step?
Going back to the theory of autopoiesis, coordinated behaviour in a social context
is communicative behaviour; and ontogenic (in other words, learned as opposed to
innate) communicative behaviour is behaviour in the linguistic domain, forming the
basis for languaging behaviour (see Section 2.1.1.5). Coordinative behaviour, in this
view, is definitely the first step towards an explanation of language.
What is missing from the L/R dancing task to take the next step into a more lin-
guistic domain is some sort of signalling behaviour; while this might make learning it
a lot more challenging, there are several ways in which the L/R task can be modified
towards this direction. As an example, with the addition of agents whose turning di-
rection depends on random or external factors, it is possible to introduce the need for
signalling and a potentially evolvable communication system. We will come back to
this with further details in section 7.7.1.
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3.2 Agent design
Now that we have a task for our agents to transmit from generation to generation,
we need to select what kind of agents we will use. The dancing task points to robot
agents, either physical or simulated, rather than humans or animals. This is in line with
the bottom-up approach that we have adopted: human subjects already have language
and learning skills, and we are not trying to study those in humans but instead to
“understand them by building” (as per the synthetic methodology of Pfeifer et al.,
2005, p. 101). But should our agents be physical robots or simulated ones?
3.2.1 On robots versus simulation
Computational modelling experiments (“simulations”) have the advantage of being
much less demanding to work with. It is easier to set up a simulation, easier to control
all aspects of both the environment and the simulated agents and easier to collect and
evaluate any results. By not having a mandatory constant “connection” with the real
world, it is easy to test different hypotheses or parameters and it becomes possible to
analyse time scales relevant to biological evolution. In contrast, robotics experiments
are hard to set up, hard to control and dependent on a number of functional or pragmatic
constraints that are not present in computational modelling.
On the other hand, Loetzsch and Spranger (2010) give a convincing account of
why actual robot experiments are preferable to computational modelling in the field of
language evolution. Their four arguments can be summarised as follows:
Increased realism: Assumptions about how an agent’s interaction with its environ-
ment happens are often unrealistic when tested out in the real world. By forcing
researchers to actually handle this interaction and make it work, the resulting
model is more realistic.
Robust models: A lot more can go wrong in robotics compared to computational
models. Accounting for all the details that are abstracted away from in a simula-
tion (like sensor noise or unexpected events) makes robotic models more robust.
Rich semantics: The real world is an extremely rich source of interaction for an agent.
This richness of semantics is in part what drives the richness of natural language.
Incorporating a subset of this richness in a simulated environment is exponen-
tially difficult.
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Figure 3.2: A physical e-puck robot (Mondada et al., 2006).
Evolutionary pressure: There is an increasing amount of evidence showing that lan-
guage concepts are bodily grounded. In a simulation it is easy to abstract away
from this bodily grounding, losing a potentially important force that drives lan-
guage evolution.
In practice, however, many of these advantages are negated by the use of carefully
constructed environments in order to keep the practical issues tractable; this was our
experience as well in some initial experiments with physical robots. In the end, we
settled for a compromise: all of the experiments described in this thesis were done
using simulated robots, but our system architecture and simulated robots were chosen
so that our model would be easy to extend to physical robot experiments (see section
7.7.4).
3.2.2 E-puck robots
The robots we chose to use were “e-pucks” (Fig. 3.2), a small but powerful robot
designed for education and research (Mondada et al., 2006). Despite their small size
and cost, e-pucks have a number of sensors (infrared proximity, accelerometer, micro-
phones, camera) and actuators (motors, speaker, LEDs). Of those, the ones relevant
for us are the motors that drive two individually controllable wheels, allowing for dif-
ferential drive locomotion; and the array of 8 infrared proximity sensors, allowing for
detection of nearby objects. The robots have a built in dsPIC microprocessor, so they
can operate autonomously, but a Bluetooth connection also opens the possibility of
remote control.
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Figure 3.3: An e-puck robot simulation in Stage. Only the proximity sensors and the
differential drive motors are simulated.
There also exist a number of software simulators that support e-puck robots, most
notably Webots (Michel, 2004) and Enki (Magnenat et al., 2011). We used “Stage”
(Vaughan, 2008) because of its built-in connectivity to ROS (“Robot Operating Sys-
tem”, Quigley et al., 2009) which allows for seamless substitution of the e-puck com-
puter simulation with a physical e-puck robot. We will come back to this point in
section 3.6. Figure 3.3 shows a simulated e-puck in Stage; the simulation only in-
cludes the peripheral proximity sensors and the differential drive motors, as these are
the systems we made use of for the experiments described in this thesis.
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Figure 3.4: An example of a feed-forward neural network (a) and a recurrent neural
network (b). Both networks have 18 nodes, 3 of which are used for external input and
3 for output. The recurrent neural network includes possibly circular connections or
neuron self-connections.
3.3 Nervous system
As we saw in section 2.1.1.3, even very simple connections between sensory and motor
areas can be described by an observer as “behaviour”. Behaviour, then, is not generated
in and does not even need a nervous system; however, a nervous system increases the
number of ways the sensory and motor areas can be connected, so it greatly enhances
an agent’s behavioural space. A plastic nervous system that can be changed in a sys-
tem’s lifetime can also enable learning, which is a necessary element of transmission
chains. In this section, we detail the choice of nervous system for our e-puck agents.
3.3.1 Recurrent neural networks
Our agents’ nervous system will be modelled using continuous time recurrent neural
networks (Beer, 1995b). In contrast to neural networks that only have feed-forward
connectivity (Figure 3.4a: the input layer sends its output to a number of hidden lay-
ers, the last of which in turn sends its output to the output layer), the hidden layer of a
recurrent neural network (“RNN”) can also have circular connections to itself, includ-
ing neuron self-connections (Figure 3.4b). Because of this connectivity pattern, the
behaviour of RNNs is a lot more complex than feed-forward networks.
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If the activation of each node of an RNN is not computed in discrete time but con-
tinuously, the network is described as a Continuous Time RNN (“CTRNN”). CTRNNs
are dynamical systems that model (heavily abstracted) biological neural networks.
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In Equation 3.1, yi is the activation of node i, w ji is the strength of the synaptic
connection from node j to node i and Ii is an external input to the node. τi and θi are





CTRNNs are simple, but powerful: Funahashi and Nakamura (1993) show that they
can be universal approximators of any dynamical function. Their rich dynamics and
biological basis make them strong candidates in dynamical and non-representational
approaches to cognitive phenomena, so CTRNNs have been often used in simulations
of locomotion and minimally cognitive phenomena (Beer and Gallagher, 1992; Beer,
1996, 2003), the evolution of coordinative behaviour and communication (Di Paolo,
1997, 2000) and for the control of physical robots (Di Paolo, 2004). They are also
extensively used in the field of evolutionary robotics, where controllers for physical
robots are evolved using genetic algorithms (Cliff et al., 1993; Harvey et al., 1997).
3.3.2 Spiking neural networks
An alternative to CTRNNs would be a spiking implementation of biological neural
networks. These implementations range from very detailed, computationally heavy
models that most closely capture the dynamics of real neurons to more abstract but
“quicker” models (see Izhikevich, 2004). Even the simpler models are more biologi-
cally plausible as models of real brains than CTRNNs, as in CTRNNs all spiking has
been abstracted away.1
1In a CTRNN, the activation y of a node represents the mean membrane potential and σ(y) is indica-
tive of the “short-term average firing frequency” (Beer, 1995b, p. 3). The actual spiking times are lost
in the averaging process.
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Spiking models are of high interest for dynamical explorations of cognitive phe-
nomena (Di Paolo, 2003) and especially so for a biologically grounded framework like
autopoiesis. Despite that fact, we decided not to use a spiking network implementation
for our experiments in order to benefit from the (relative) simplicity of CTRNNs. We
will discuss possible future work using a spiking implementation in section 7.7.3.
3.4 Learning
The Iterated Learning models are based on successive episodes of transmission from
agent to agent, and in essence a transmission episode is an episode of learning. It
follows, then, that the choice of implementation of learning is an important design
decision. Autopoietic theory is not of much help here; as we saw in section 2.1.1.4,
its definition of learning is very wide (“A phenomenon of transformation of the ner-
vous system associated to a behavioural change that takes place under maintained au-
topoiesis”; Maturana and Varela 1980, pp. 35-38). This tells us that any plastic change
of the nervous system that leads to a change in behaviour is learning, as long as it
does not lead to a cease of the organism’s process of autopoiesis (in other words, to its
death).
3.4.1 Learning & CTRNNs
A more substantial constraint comes from our choice of nervous system: recurrent
neural networks are powerful, but also very challenging to train (Jaeger, 2002). We
will go over a short list of potential approaches.
“Engineering” approaches: Most training approaches for recurrent neural networks
target engineering and signal processing applications; they also often use dis-
crete time networks or supervised learning, both of which are incompatible with
our scenario of two agents interacting and learning in continuous time. An ex-
tensive tutorial on some of those approaches (back-propagation through time,
extended Kalman filtering, real-time recurrent learning, echo-state networks) is
given by Jaeger (2002).
Genetic algorithms: Almost all research that employs CTRNNs uses genetic algo-
rithms to train them (Beer and Gallagher, 1992; Di Paolo, 1997; Harvey et al.,
1997; Quinn, 2001). Evolutionary computation methods have proven very useful
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in finding sets of weights that enable CTRNNs to exhibit interesting behaviour.
This is not an option in our case; as we repeated in section 3.1.2, transmission
chains happen in ontogenetic and glossogenetic rather than phylogenetic (evolu-
tionary) timescales.
Fixed weight learning: Yamauchi and Beer (1994) show that it is possible to evolve
CTRNNs that learn based on reinforcement from the environment. Each evolved
agent can exhibit a number of behaviours; in its ontogenesis, environmental rein-
forcement “selects” one of these possible behaviours. Furthermore, this happens
purely based on network inner dynamics, without any weight changes. Blynel
and Floreano (2003) expand this to learning how to solve a “T”-maze. This
approach is potentially suitable for our experiment and intriguing from an au-
topoietic background, although it is hard to ground it in a biological explanation.
We decided against adopting it, however, as the addition of an evolutionary stage
would increase the scope of the project too far.
3.4.2 Hebbian learning & STDP
In addition to the approaches discussed above, there is a vast literature that studies
learning from a biological perspective, as synaptic plasticity in the brain. The specific
theories and mechanisms involved are numerous, and depend on the type of learning
that is being explained. The type of learning most applicable to the task we described
in 3.1.2 is instrumental or operant conditioning, in which reward (or punishment) is
used to strengthen the association of a stimulus and a response. The most common
theory of how instrumental conditioning works is Hebb’s rule:
Let us assume that the persistence or repetition of a reverberatory activity
(or “trace”) tends to induce lasting cellular changes that add to its stability.
When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly
or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic
change takes place in one or both cells such that A’s efficiency, as one of
the cells firing B, is increased. (Hebb, 1949)
In other words, when a node A fires and repeatedly causes node B to fire as well,
the synaptic connection between them is strengthened. The biological process behind
this is spike-timing dependent plasticity (“STDP”). According to STDP, if there is a
spike in node A’s activity shortly before a spike in node B’s activity, the A-B synapse
is strengthened (long-term potentiation, “LTP”); if the spike in node A’s activity comes
shortly after, the A-B synapse is weakened instead (long-term depression, “LTD”).
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Figure 3.5: According to the STDP process, the synaptic strength s(t) of the connection
between two nodes is modulated by the interval between the pre-synaptic node firing
(tpre) and the post-synaptic node firing (tpost ). When the pre-synaptic node fires shortly
before the post-synaptic, τ = tpost − tpre > 0 and s(t) increases; if the post-synaptic
node fires first, τ < 0 and s(t) decreases (adapted from Izhikevich, 2007, p. 2444).
A graph of how STDP interacts with the time interval between node A firing (tpre)
and node B firing (tpost) is shown in Fig. 3.5. This temporal precedence τ = tpost− tpre
is a measure of causality in the activations of the nodes, also implicitly present in
Hebb’s definition of learning.
One issue that is problematic in most STDP accounts is known as the “distal re-
ward” problem (Izhikevich, 2007). In most learning scenarios, any reward or punish-
ment is not administered instantly but some seconds after the neural firing patterns that
connect stimulus to behavioural output. Also, both before and after those firing pat-
terns that lead to the behaviour that is to be reinforced, all nodes tend to fire randomly.
How does the learning mechanism then know which connections to “reward”?
Izhikevich (2007) solves this problem by using a learning mechanism that com-
bines STDP as a “tagging” mechanism with reward-based reinforcement. The way
this works is detailed in Fig. 3.6; instead of STDP directly adjusting the synaptic
strength s of the connection between two neurons, it only adjusts a “tagging” variable
(or eligibility trace) c, increasing it if the pre-synaptic node fires shortly before the
post-synaptic one; it then decays back to resting levels over some seconds.
When the system produces the wanted behaviour, it is rewarded by an increase in
the concentration of dopamine, d, in the system. The synaptic strength is controlled
both by the eligibility trace and by this concentration of dopamine:
ṡ(t) = c(t) ·d(t) (3.3)
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When the co-activation of the two nodes leads to a reward, the combination of c > 0
and d > 0 leads to the “tagged” connections being strengthened; since c decays slowly,
this happens even if the reward comes a few seconds later than the initial co-activation.
A simplified implementation of this learning method, adapted for CTRNN instead
of spiking networks, is what we will use for our experiments. We will detail and
discuss our own implementation extensively in Chapter 4.
3.5 Experiment design
So far we have outlined what our agents will look like (simulated e-puck robots with
continuous-time recurrent neural networks as nervous systems), what the task these
agents will be asked to accomplish will be (a joint action left/right “dancing” task) and
how the agents will learn how to perform that task (tag-based reinforcement learning).
Here we will examine how these components tie together in a cohesive experiment.
3.5.1 Dancing task, input and output
The L/R dancing task that we described in section 3.1.4 can essentially be summarised
by the following rule: “If there is another agent in proximity, then turn to the left / turn
to the right”. Which direction the robot needs to turn towards for successful dancing
depends of course on the partner as well; regardless, this association between proximity
and turning left or turning right is what the agent has to learn.
The input to the agent’s nervous system comes directly from the e-puck infrared
sensors and indicates proximity: another agent nearby stimulates the network’s input
node. (This stimulation happens regardless of which of the eight infrared sensors de-
tected proximity.) The output is trickier, because while the response behaviour seems
simple (turning around an object) it is actually quite complex, as it involves the use of
sensors as well as motors (in order to keep the distance from the target object consis-
tent). To simplify the task, we decided to “offload” the turning behaviour to a separate
action module that takes a simple output from the agent’s nervous system (“R” or “L”)
and translates it to the respective low-level behaviour (Fig. 3.7).
While not ideal, this design decision is justifiable, since a model of the acquisition
of sensorimotor associations is beyond the scope of our project. Through either a
developmental or evolutionary process, our agents have a pre-existing (and admittedly,
quite poor) behavioural repertoire. Their task is then to learn to associate one of these
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Figure 3.6: A method combining STDP and dopamine rewards to solve the “distal re-
ward” problem (Izhikevich, 2007). (a): Given a neural connection between neuron 1
(pre-neuron) and neuron 2 (post-neuron), s is the synaptic strength of the connection
and c is an “eligibility trace” that acts as a tagging variable. (b): The value of c(t) is
given by the STDP function; if neuron 1 fires shortly before neuron 2, c(t) > 0. (c): If
a reward d(t) is delivered, even if it is a few seconds after the co-incidental firing, the
synaptic strength s(t) of the connection is still increased, as the decay rate of c(t) is
longer than a few seconds. (d): By repeatedly rewarding co-incidental firings of neurons
1 and 2, the connection between them is gradually changed to be significantly stronger
than other synapses in the system.
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Figure 3.7: Schematic of e-puck robot, action module and RNN. Input from the robot’s
proximity sensors directly stimulates the neural network’s input node; the values of the
two “R” and “L” output nodes are redirected to the action module, which in turn trans-
lates them to low-level motor commands making the robot turn around in the respective
direction.
behaviours with the appropriate stimulus (in this case, another agent’s proximity).
3.5.2 Teaching and learning
We established what agents have to learn; the question that remains now is, how will
they learn it? Since L/R dancing is a joint action task, learning must happen through
reinforcement during an interaction of the learning agent (the “learner”) with an expert
agent already proficient at the task (the “teacher”). Turning in the same direction as the
teacher leads to successful dancing; if this is rewarded enough times, the connection
between stimulus and the correct response will be strengthened, leading to learning.
On the other hand, turning in the wrong direction will lead to crashing; punishing any
crashes will also help learning.
At this point we must note that while from now on we will often refer to the expert
agent as the “teacher” for convenience, we are definitely not making the claim that
this is actual teaching behaviour. While teaching is believed to occur in some animals
such as bees and whales in addition to humans (Hoppitt et al., 2008), it is defined as
“actively facilitating learning in others” (Hoppitt et al., 2008, p. 486) — something
that is completely missing from our system, where the expert is “teaching” only by
giving consistent left or right responses.
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Figure 3.8: A L/R dancing transmission chain. A pair of teacher-learner agents inter-
act, with the teacher removed in each successive generation and the previous learner
interacting as a teacher with a new learner.
3.5.3 Transmission chains
Our goal is to link individual learning events into cultural transmission chains, main-
taining a certain behaviour through successive generations of learning and teaching.
In order to do this, we will start with two agents (an expert “teacher” and a “learner”)
interacting; for each generation, we will remove the teacher and add a new learner; the
former learning agent will now play the teacher’s role and interact with the new agent,
hopefully transmitting whatever behaviour they learned from their own teacher (Fig.
3.8). We will get into more detail on transmission chains in Chapter 5.
3.6 System design
We have described a number of components: a simulated robot in an (also simulated)
environment, a neural network, a joint action task that rewards or punishes the agents
taking part in it, and an experiment that makes us of all other components. We will
close this chapter by describing the design of the system that connects everything to-
gether.
The system was designed to be highly modular; in this way, we can easily test new
modules and replace any of the existing ones without having to make changes to the
rest of the system. A schematic of the whole system, including all modules and their
connections, is sketched in Fig. 3.9. The individual modules are the following:
Robot & environment simulation: We implemented the e-puck robots (Fig. 3.9a)
and their environment (Fig. 3.9b) in the Stage simulator (Vaughan, 2008). Stage
provides a ROS (Quigley et al., 2009) interface through which each robot can
be controlled and its sensory information accessed; it also provides information
about the state of the environment, such as robot positions or simulation time.
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Figure 3.9: Schematic of all the system components and connections between them.
The e-puck robots (a) and their environment (b) are implemented in a Stage simulator.
Their neural network controllers (c) are implemented in MATLAB and interface with
Stage through ROS. A reward server (d) collects information from the environment and,
depending on the task, issues rewards or punishments to the neural network controllers
for use in the learning algorithm. The experiment control scripts (e) coordinate all other
components into coherent experiments, using simulation timing information from Stage.
Neural network: We implemented the RNN controllers (Fig. 3.9c), including the
learning algorithm, in MATLAB (MATLAB, 2014). The controllers interface
with the simulated robots through ROS, retrieving sensory input and issuing mo-
tor commands. (The robots’ action module is also implemented in MATLAB.)
Task: The task is represented in a “reward server” (Fig. 3.9d) that we implemented in
ROS; the server takes world information (agent positions, velocities and timing)
from Stage and, depending on the task, decides whether to reward or punish
each agent in the form of positive or negative dopamine administration. (Reward
and punishment information is transmitted to the neural network controllers and
used in the learning algorithm; on successful dancing or crashing, both agents
are rewarded or punished accordingly.)
Experiment control: Finally, the specific experiments are coordinated using “experi-
ment control scripts” (Fig. 3.9e) implemented in ROS; the scripts create, modify
and replace agents as needed, using simulation timing information from Stage
to make sure that all experimental steps are synchronised. The configuration of
each experiment will be discussed in detail in the next chapters.
Chapter 4
Learning in isolated pairs
As mentioned in the previous chapter, at the base of cultural transmission chains are
single episodes of learning. In this chapter we will go into detail on the implementa-
tion of a learning algorithm, based on the STDP “distal reward” learning proposed by
Izhikevich (2007). We will first establish that the learning implementation works in
both a disembodied “brain in a vat” test and in isolated pairs of learners and experts
performing the joint action L/R dancing task. Having done that, we will examine how
the length of interaction time in the learning pairs influences task success rates.
4.1 Learning implementation
In section 3.4.2 we mentioned a biologically plausible reinforcement learning model
(Izhikevich, 2007) based on spike-timing dependent plasticity: when two neurons fire
within a short time interval, indicating causality in their firing behaviour, their con-
nection gets tagged. When reward comes in the form of dopamine (DA), only the
connections that are tagged are strengthened. This synaptic tag takes a few seconds
to decay; this means that even if the reward comes later than the neural activity which
caused the rewarded behaviour, the right neural pathway can be strengthened.
In our case, there is a significant difference: we are using continuous time neu-
ral networks instead of spiking networks. CTRNNs don’t simulate spiking incidents;
instead, the average firing frequency of node i is represented by the node’s activation
value (yi). Our learning algorithm is based on the Izhikevich model, but since we have
no access to spiking times, we use a co-activation detection metric instead of STDP to
detect causal activations. The basic idea, as shown in Fig. 4.1, is still the same: connec-
tions that activate together get tagged, and tagged connections get strengthened when
a behaviour is rewarded (in the form of a supply of dopamine to the whole network).
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Figure 4.1: Basic idea of the “tag & reward” learning algorithm. An increase in node
A’s synaptic activity leads to a change in node B’s activity; the correlation between the
activation values yA and yB leads to the A→ B connection being tagged. This persists
for a few seconds (a). If the A→ B activation pattern led to a rewarded behaviour, the
dopamine released in the network strengthens the value of the tagged A→ B connec-
tion. As the connection’s tagged status persists, even late rewards can strengthen the
right connections (b).
We will discuss some of the implementation details below and in the next section we
will present a basic overview of the algorithm’s flow.
4.1.1 Learning algorithm: main points
Neural network simulation: As we saw in section 3.4, CTRNNs are dynamical sys-
tems described by Equation 3.1. We approximate the solution of the dynamical
system by using the Euler method; given a ẏ = f (y) system and a time step size
of h, the Euler method approximates the value of y as yt+1 = yt +h · f (yt). In our
case, for a CTRNN, the Euler approximation is:











Once more, σ is the sigmoid function: σ(x) = 11+e−x . For a CTRNN simulation
a value of h = 0.01, equivalent to 100 time steps for every simulated second,
gives a sufficiently good approximation. This is the value we will be using for
all experiments described from now on.
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RNN parameters: There are two parameters in Equation 4.1 that control the be-
haviour of network nodes: τ (a node’s time constant) and θ (a node’s bias term).
Lower τ leads to nodes that react more quickly to input, while θ controls the rel-
ative bias of each connection; positive θ j values lead to amplified responses to
stimulation from a specific connection between neurons i and j, while negative
values lead to muted responses. Changing these parameters can lead to drastic
changes in the behaviour of the network; by a process of trial and error, we set-
tled on values of τ = 0.1 and θ = −4 for all nodes, which led to networks that
respond quickly (but not instantaneously) to perturbation.1 Further work could
be done towards a more systematic approach to selecting these variables; they
could also be potentially incorporated into the learning mechanism, allowing for
different values of τ and θ for different nodes.
External stimulation: One or more nodes in the network (the “input” nodes) get stim-
ulated by external perturbation; this is accomplished by manipulating the Ii pa-
rameter of input nodes. In our system, the external perturbation corresponds to
the detection of a nearby object by the proximity sensors. For simplicity, we
only use one input node that gets stimulated with a “current” of I = 10 if any of
the eight proximity sensors detect a value lower than a threshold proxthr = 1.5.
In both the physical and simulated e-pucks, there can be momentary failures in
sensory reporting that lead to erroneous behaviour in the system. This can be
prevented by choosing higher values of τ for input nodes, providing a “buffer”
against instantaneous changes; in our system, we instead kept a rolling window
of the 10 latest values obtained from each sensor and used the average of those
values to determine proximity, smoothing out any momentary sensor failure.
Noise: In order to be able to learn, our network depends on random co-activations of
network pathways that happen to produce the correct response to a certain stim-
ulus. These random co-activations would not be possible without some sort of
noise. In actual nervous systems, this noise is electrical noise from surrounding
neurons; in our neural network, we model this by additive white Gaussian noise
with a signal to noise ratio of SNR = 10dB via the external node input Ii. We
made the choice of excluding the input and output nodes from this noise addi-
tion; sensor noise is already present in the input node as part of the e-Puck Stage
1Note that the effect of θ on a system must be balanced relatively to the intensity of any external
stimulation perturbing it.
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simulator, and we wanted the output nodes to only be driven by activations of
pathways of the neural network.
Output control: As we mentioned in section 3.6, the output nodes of the neural net-
works controlling the agents are not directly connected to the agents’ motors.
Instead, two output nodes are each associated with a specific behaviour (“dance
left” or “dance right”) that a lower level action module then translates into motor
commands. Along with these two action modules, another low-level component
is a crash recovery module that takes over and forces the e-puck to back off if a
crash is detected.
Barring that, behaviour selection depends on the relative activation levels of the
output nodes. As an example, let us suppose a system with two behaviours (A
and B) and two corresponding output nodes, with activation values of yA and yB.
In order for behaviour A to be selected, two conditions need to be present:




Behaviour A can only be selected if the value of the corresponding node’s acti-
vation yA (after subtracting a measure of normalised activation ||yA||) is higher
than a threshold θout (4.2a). ||yi|| refers to the resting activation of node i when
no stimulus and no noise are present in the system. This ensures that without
stimulus, the system’s resting response is neither behaviour A nor behaviour B,
which can only be produced in response to a stimulus. For the experiments we
detail in this thesis the resting response is a random walk; without any object in
proximity, agents wander around randomly. This facilitates encountering other
agents to try and complete the L/R dancing task with.
In addition to the above constraint, in order for the system to respond with be-
haviour A, the relative activation of yA compared to yB must be higher than a
certain threshold θdiff (4.2b). In theory, lower values of θdiff can lead to shorter
learning times but less robust behaviour. In our experiments, we used threshold
values of θout = 0.3 and θdiff = 1.1.
One extra constraint added to make the agents’ behaviour more stable was to lock
the selected behaviour while the stimulus that caused it is present. This makes
dancing easier to maintain; however, it also blocks agents from learning more
complex combinations of behaviours and its biological plausibility is suspect.
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Causal activation detection: Since, as we mentioned, spike timing information is ab-
stracted away in CTRNNs, we need a way of detecting when two nodes yi and
y j interact in a causal manner. Instead of STDP, we used the following “CA”
co-activation measure, based on the multiplication of the rates of change of the
activations of nodes i and j, passed through an arctan high-pass filter (Fig. 4.2):2
CAi j = f (dyi · |dy j| · y j), where (4.3a)
f (x) =
0, x < 0arctan(x), x≥ 0 (4.3b)
The value of dyi · |dy j| increases only when both nodes fire together (so that
dyi > 0 and dy j > 0 at the same time). |dy j| is normalised to allow for the re-
inforcement of inhibitory connections; the multiplication by y j and the arctan
high-pass filter (4.3b) help with exaggerating the difference between two post-
synaptic nodes that both get stimulated by the same pre-synaptic node. Note
that this means that in our learning implementation, the co-activation variable
CA is not binary: random input noise can mean that a single pre-synaptic node
activation can lead to two post-synaptic nodes being marked as co-active in par-
allel with different intensity. This allows for the network pathways that lead
to rewarded behaviour to be strengthened comparatively to all other stimulated
pathways, as the CA measure is directly connected to the tagging variable c:
ċ =−c/τc +CA (4.4)
This differential equation (4.4) means that when two nodes are detected as co-
activating, their connection gets tagged; the tagging variable then decays at a rate
of τc. In all the experiments described from here on, we used a value of τc = 2
which leads to a decay time of around 5 seconds, consistent with biological
results as reported by Izhikevich (2007, p. 2445).
As an example of the effect of noise in the tagging of specific connections, let
us consider a basic network of three nodes, where node 1 is connected to nodes
2A better measure that we tested was based on the cross-correlation of the two signals; if the corre-
lation between yi and y j is maximised when applying a negative time shift on yi, we have an indication
that a change in yi led to a corresponding change in y j. The measure we ended up using is much less
computationally expensive, however, and it works well for small networks as long as there are no direct
closed loops between two nodes.
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Figure 4.2: High-pass filter using arctan.
Figure 4.3: A simple network of 3 nodes;
node 1 is connected to nodes 2 & 3 with
equal weights w = 2.
2 & 3 and both connections have a weight of w = 2 (Fig. 4.3). Node 1 is
externally stimulated, causing the value of its activation y1 to change from 0 to
10 (Fig. 4.4a). This stimulation propagates to nodes 2 & 3 as well, changing
the values of their activations y2 and y3. In the absence of noise, the values of
y2 and y3 would be the same; however, higher noise in the input I2 of node 2
makes it so that y2 > y3 (Fig. 4.4b), possibly leading to a different response for
the rest of the network. Fig. 4.4c and 4.4d show the values of the co-activation
detection variables (CA) and tagging variables (c) respectively, for each of the
connections. While both connections are tagged, connection 1→ 2 has a higher
tagging variable c compared to connection 1→ 3. In the event of a reward, w12
will be increased more than w13. In Fig. 4.4d we can also see the gradual decay
of the tagging variables c12, c13 over approximately 5 seconds.
Weight changes: The final step left for our learning algorithm is the combination
of the tagging variable c with an external influx of dopamine (DA) in order to
strengthen the synaptic weights w of tagged connections. The externally admin-
istered DA sets the system’s levels of dopamine, d:
ḋ =−d/τd +DA (4.5)
The time constant τd affects the rate of decay of the dopamine levels; we used
a value of τd = 0.2. Finally, high levels of dopamine in the system increase the
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Figure 4.4: An example of the effect of noise in the tagging of the connections of a
3-node network. Stimulation of node 1 (a) leads to changes in the activation y of con-
nected nodes 2 & 3 (b). White Gaussian noise leads to stronger initial activation in
node 2; which in turn leads to increased co-activation detection (c) and, finally, tagging
variable c2 compared to c3 (d). The tagging variable decays after approx. 5 seconds.
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synaptic weights w of tagged connections, as long as they are within the bounds
of the minimum and maximum values allowed, wmin and wmax:
ẇ =
c ·d, wmin < w < wmax0, otherwise (4.6)
The minimum value wmin is set to the initial weight values of each network, winit .
We need a minimum weight value in order to stop the networks from being able
to degenerate into non-responsiveness.
Equivalently, without a maximum weight value constant positive reinforcement
after the system reaches a state where it always outputs the reinforced behaviour
leads to the weight values spiralling out of control. This is partly because of how
we calculate the tagging variable for each synaptic connection. Higher weight
values wi j lead to higher activation y j in the respective nodes, higher tagging
variable ci j (Eq. 4.3a, 4.4) and, finally, even higher weight values (Eq. 4.6).
The maximum weight limit could potentially be replaced (or reinforced) with
the addition of a maximum value for the synaptic tag c; the spiking neuron im-
plementation, however, also limits the weights of each connection to a specific
range (Izhikevich, 2007, p. 2445). The maximum weight value we used in the
experiments described in this thesis was wmax = 10.
While any of the weights hold this maximum value, all weights in the network
stop increasing. This is a measure that is biologically suspect, but is needed
in order to stop all weights in the network from eventually reaching wmax, un-
doing the comparative strengthening of the learning process; this issue is also
recognised and discussed by Izhikevich (2007, p. 2447). It is important to note,
however, that while the network weights are stopped from increasing, the learn-
ing process is not frozen at this point, as weights can still decrease as a result of
punishment. Punishment is implemented through negative DA values; this, once
more, is a biologically impossible “cheat” that is only used as a shortcut in place
of a proper punishment mechanism (for a “proper” mechanism, see for example
Cohen et al., 2012). We will return to the significance of the maximum weight
values and the weight strengthening “freeze” for some of our model’s interesting
behaviour in Chapter 5.
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4.1.2 Learning algorithm: flow overview
We detailed all the main points of our “tag & reward” learning algorithm in the pre-
vious section; here, we will give an overview of the algorithm’s flow. Each time step
corresponds to h = 0.01 = 1/100 of a simulated second. The correspondence of sim-
ulated seconds to real-time seconds depends on the simulation speed of our simulator,
Stage (see section 3.6). The non-essential parts of the algorithm, such an initialisation,
output, visualisations and graphing are not included below.
A: Pre-Euler actions (every 10 time steps)
1. Update sensors: Get the proximity sensor data from the simulator and the DA
reward data from the reward server.
2. Add noise: Add Gaussian white noise to all nodes except for the input and
output nodes.
3. Synchronise timers: Wait for the Stage simulator if the internal timer is ahead,
notify if the internal timer is behind.
B: Euler simulation (every 1 time steps)
1. CTRNN update: Calculate the new values of y for the network (Eq. 4.1).
2. Dopamine level update: Update the level of dopamine d in the system based
on the current value of DA (Eq. 4.5).
3. Tagging update: Tag co-activating connections (Eq. 4.3a, 4.3b).
4. Weights update: Update weights (Eq. 4.6).
C: Post-Euler actions (every 10 time steps)
1. Crash avoidance: If a crash is imminent, let the low-level crashing avoidance
system take over.
2. Output control: Determine whether to produce any behaviour; if yes, call the
respective low-level function (Eq. 4.2a, 4.2b).
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Figure 4.5: RNN used in the “brain in a vat” test. Connections shown in red are in-
hibitory, initialised with w23 = w32 =−2. All other connections are excitatory, initialised
with w12 = w13 = 2 and w24 = w35 = 5. Node 4 is the “Right” behaviour output node,
while node 5 is “Left”. Node 1 is the input node.
4.1.3 Learning algorithm: “brain in a vat” test
In order to show that the “tag & reward” learning algorithm we detailed works as
intended, in this section we describe a simple “brain in a vat” test case. For the test,
we will use a 5-node RNN with 1 input and 2 output nodes (Fig. 4.5: connections
shown in red are inhibitory, initialised with w23 = w32 = −2. All other connections
are excitatory, initialised with w12 = w13 = 2 and w24 = w35 = 5.). Node 1 is the input
node; node 4 is the “Right” behaviour output node, while node 5 is “Left”.
Instead of connecting this network to the body of an agent, the input node is directly
stimulated with I1 = 10 for t = 0.5s, alternating with I1 = 0 for t = 0.5s. DA diffusion
is also directly controlled: a response of “Right” behaviour under stimulus is rewarded
with DAr = 1, while a response of “Left” behaviour under stimulus is punished with
DAp =−0.5. In both cases, the reward or punishment is artificially delayed by t = 3s
to represent the delayed reward of an actual task.
Fig. 4.6 shows an instance of delayed reward. Stimulation of the input node 1 leads
to increased activation in both of its connected nodes, 2 & 3. However, input noise
randomly causes node 2 to activate more (4.6a), leading to a higher tagging variable
(4.6b) and, through the neural pathway N1→N2→N4, to the system responding with
“Right” behaviour. Since this is the rewarded behaviour, 3 seconds later a DA influx
increases the dopamine concentration in the system (4.6c). The combination of tagging
(c12 > 0) and reward (d > 0) will lead to an increase in the connection’s strength (w12).
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Figure 4.6: An instance of delayed reward. Node 1 leads to increased activation y in
both of its connected nodes, 2 & 3. However, input noise leads to y2, shown in red,
being higher than y3, shown in green (a). This leads to a higher tagging variable y12 (b)
and eventually to delayed reward (c). The combination of tagging and reward will lead
to an increase in the tagged connection’s synaptic strength w12.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.7: The weights of the “brain in a vat” network before (a) and after (b) 8 minutes
of learning; initially, the weights of the connective pathway leading to “R” behaviour
(N1→ N2→ N4) are the same as the weights of the pathway leading to “L” (N1→
N3→ N5). After learning, the weights of the “R” pathway are strengthened.
Fig. 4.8 shows the results of 10 minutes of learning. As we can see in Fig. 4.8a, the
connections leading to “R” behaviour (N1→ N2→ N4) are gradually strengthened,
with w12 reaching wmax around t = 8m. The weights of the network before and after
learning are shown in Fig. 4.7.
As a consequence of the weight changes, the rate of behaviour “R”, initially equal
to the “L” rate, increases (Fig. 4.8b); eventually the system reaches a 100% chance of
responding with “R” behaviour when stimulated.
4.2 Isolated pair learning experiments
In section 4.1.3, we showed that our “tag & reward” algorithm successfully learns a
stimulus-response association when the stimulus and reward are administered artifi-
cially. With the parameters that we chose, it took the system around 8 minutes to reach
a success rate of 100%, but this might be considerably different in the less controlled
case of agent to agent interaction. Learning success rate is a really important parameter
in our system, especially in a population chain where one generation’s learners become
the next generation’s teachers.
Our goal then for the rest of this chapter is twofold:
A. We want to show that our learning algorithm works in a joint action, task-oriented
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.8: The results of 10 minutes of learning with the “brain in a vat” test system.
The behaviour associated with node 4 (“R”) is rewarded, so the pathway N1→ N2→
N4 is strengthened (a). After 8 minutes of learning, w12 = wmax and the learning pro-
cess stops. While initially the rates of both behaviours are similar, the probability of
the system responding with the rewarded behaviour “R” increases over time, eventually
reaching 1 (b). Rates are calculated over 1m.
scenario;
B. We also want to investigate how learning time interacts with final task success rates,
the obvious hypothesis being that shorter learning times lead to lower success rates.
In the next sections we will describe an experimental setup that will allow us to
investigate points A and B above.
4.2.1 Setup
The isolated pair learning experiments involve two agents interacting. One of the
agents is a learner, a simulated e-puck agent with the same simple neural network
as our “brain in a vat” experiment, shown in Fig. 3.4. The network is using the learn-
ing algorithm we detailed in section 4.1. The other agent is an expert, a simulated
e-puck agent whose behaviour is preset: it wanders around until its proximity sensors
detect something in range, then starts turning to the “Right” or “Left” (depending on
whether it is an R-expert or an L-expert).
The two agents are initially placed in their starting positions, facing each other but
out of proximity sensor range (Fig. 4.9a); they are then left to interact for a specific
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.9: (a): Starting positions for agent0 (expert) and agent1 (learner) in the Stage
simulator. The agents are facing each other but are not in sensory range. (b): The two
agents successfully “dancing”; this is detected and rewarded.
length of time tlearn. The agents are automatically reset to their starting position every
treset; each such reset usually leads to a learning episode, unless the agents’ random
walk does not bring them within sensory range of each other.
If the agents successfully dance (Fig. 4.9b; Fig. 4.10a, b), they are rewarded
with DAr = 1; if they crash into each other (Fig. 4.10c, d), they are punished with
DAp = −0.5. (There is also a small chance that the agents meet, fail to dance but do
not crash either; this is usually due to a null response from either of the agents; an
example is agent1 in Fig. 4.10e.)
All response behaviour of the learning agent is logged; after each learning episode
(so after treset seconds) we calculate a rolling mean rate of the last 10 responses for
each possible response type (“Right”, “Left”, “None”). The mean rate of the response
type that corresponds to the expert agent (“Right” for R-expert, “Left” for L-expert) is
the success rate of the learning agent; the mean success rate in the last two minutes of
the agents’ interaction is the final success rate.
4.2.2 Results: successful learning example
Fig. 4.11 shows an example of successful learning in a pair of agents (L-expert and
learner). Learning time tlearn is set to 15 minutes and treset is set to 15 seconds. The
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Figure 4.10: Some examples of possible different interactions between two e-puck
agents (a teacher, agent0 and a learner, agent1) trying to complete the L-R dancing
task. The agents successfully dance if they turn in the same direction (“left-left”, a;
“right-right”, b) and crash if they turn in opposite directions (“right-left”, c; “left-right”, d).
Null responses occasionally lead to the agents missing each other (e; agent1 produces
a null response).
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initial direction of the expert agent is reinforced, gradually increasing the weights of
the relevant connections (w13, w35) more than the rest in the learning agent’s nervous
system (Fig. 4.11c). This leads the agent to respond with the rewarded behaviour
with a higher rate (Fig. 4.11a, 4.11b). After 6 minutes of learning, the learning agent
responds to the expert’s proximity only with “Left”, so the agents always successfully
dance. After 11 minutes, w13 = wmax and the weights stop increasing any further.
4.2.3 Results: learning time and success rate
In order to investigate how learning time influences final task success rate, we ran 50
simulations for a number of different learning times from 1m to 20m. We balanced the
behaviour rewarded by using an R-expert for half of the simulations and an L-expert
for the other half. In all cases, reset times were set to treset = 15s, reward values were
DAr = 1 and punishment values DAp = −0.5. The distributions of the final success
rates of all runs with tlearn = 5m, 7m, 10m and 15m can be seen in Fig. 4.12.
As expected, longer learning times lead to higher success rates. For a learning
time of 5m the average success rate is 65%, standard deviation σ = 0.17 (Fig. 4.12a)
while for a learning time of 12m almost all agents successfully learn the task (average
success rate is 99%, standard deviation σ = 0.05, Fig. 4.12d). For comparison, the
baseline success rate of a non-learning agent is slightly lower than 50%, accounting
for the possibility of “no-action” responses to stimulation.3
A better overview of this trend can be seen in Fig. 4.13. Fig 4.13a is a plot of the
mean final success rate against the learning time tlearn; the relation appears to be linear
before plateauing at success rates very close to 100% for learning times longer than
12m. The error bars in Fig. 4.13a indicate the standard deviation.
Fig. 4.13b shows the probability density functions of the final success rates for all
learning times tested. Once more, we can see that for shorter learning times the success
rates are distributed around values close to 50% with a high spread; long learning times
lead to higher mean success rates, with the spread being very low for tlearn > 12m.
3A no-learning test run with artificial stimulation for 20 minutes gave a rate of 2% no-action re-
sponses.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4.11: An example of a single agent learning by interacting with an L-expert agent
for tlearn = 15m. Fig. (a) and (b) show a scatter plot and a rate chart of the learning
agent’s behaviour over time: initially the system’s response includes all behaviours. As
“Left” gets rewarded, the weights of the respective neural pathway w13, w35 increase
(c) and the system’s behaviour gradually shifts to exclusively “Left”.
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(a) Learning time tlearn = 5m. Mean success
rate of 65%, standard deviation σ = 0.17.
(b) Learning time tlearn = 7m. Mean success
rate of 78%, standard deviation σ = 0.18.
(c) Learning time tlearn = 10m. Mean success
rate of 95%, standard deviation σ = 0.10.
(d) Learning time tlearn = 12m. Mean success
rate of 99%, standard deviation σ = 0.05.
Figure 4.12: Distributions of the final success rates for 50 learning simulations (25 using
an R-expert, 25 using an L-expert) for various values of tlearn. As expected, longer
learning times lead to higher success rates. In all experiments treset = 15s, DAr = 1
and DAp =−0.5. The baseline success rate of a non-learning agent would be slightly
lower than 50%.
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(a) A plot of the mean final success rate against the learning time tlearn.
The relation appears to be linear before plateauing at success rates very
close to 100% for learning times longer than 12m. The error bars indicate
the standard deviation.
(b) Probability density functions of the final success rates for all learning
times tested. For shorter learning times, the success rates are distributed
around values close to 50% with a high spread. Long learning times
lead to higher mean success rates, with the spread being very low for
tlearn > 12m.
Figure 4.13: Effect of learning time tlearn on final task success rates. Again, the data
shown is the result of 50 learning simulations (25 using an R-expert, 25 using an L-
expert) with treset = 15s, DAr = 1 and DAp =−0.5.
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4.3 Discussion
In the first part of this chapter we detailed a “tag & reward” learning algorithm for
CTRNNs, based on the STDP distal reward algorithm proposed by Izhikevich (2007).
In the second part, we established that using this algorithm, learning works in isolated
pairs of expert and learner agents; and that the success rate of the learning agents in
the L/R dancing task depends on how long they interact with the expert agent for.
The implementation we discussed in this chapter has numerous shortcomings; we
use a very simple neural network (Fig. 4.5); we make a number of assumptions that
are not biologically plausible but that were needed to get a working system (detailed in
section 4.1); we use a number of pre-wired behaviours (Right/Left dancing, wandering,
crash avoidance). None of these, however, are fundamental aspects of our system, but
rather “shortcuts” due to time constraints. Ways around them and future work that
would make for a more principled approach will be discussed in Chapter 7.
One aspect of the learning algorithm that we have not touched on so far is its
general applicability as a learning mechanism for continuous real-time recurrent neural
networks. As we mentioned in Section 3.4, the reason we applied the “tag & reward”
learning approach to CTRNNs was that we wanted to avoid the complexity of spiking
networks, as used by Izhikevich (2007); but at the same time, implement ontogenetic
learning, as opposed to the phylogenetic process of evolutionary computation methods
that CTRNNs are usually trained with.
Since we did not test our learning algorithm in a more general setting, its applica-
bility to recurrent neural networks of random topology and more general tasks remains
to be seen. In retrospect, however, the loss of spike timing information in CTRNNs
means that in order to implement the causal co-activation detection needed for Izhike-
vich’s algorithm, we have to either use a measure that is potentially too simple to scale
up to more complex use cases; or use measures that are computationally complex,
negating the advantage over using actual spiking networks (see Section 4.1.1, “Causal
activation detection”).
That said, our goal is not to put forward a cutting-edge model of biologically plau-
sible learning but to examine cultural transmission in the context of a non represen-
tational, autopoietic view of cognition. We would argue that, in view of this goal,
the results we presented in this chapter are exactly what was needed as a first step: a
minimal but self-contained, working system of an isolated episode of transmission of
joint action behaviour; that uses biologically plausible mechanisms; and that makes as
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few assumptions as possible that are clearly stated and not essential for the learning
process.
Furthermore, despite the minimal nature of the system, it exhibits an interesting
aspect: learning is not binary. Agents can learn the R/L dancing task in various mea-
sures of success, depending on both chance, as the system is stochastic, and, as we saw
earlier in this chapter, on how long they interact with each other. This aspect, ampli-
fied through a chain of repeated transmission, can potentially lead to complex system
behaviour.
In the next chapter, we will take another step towards our goal by building on this
chapter’s experiments and combining isolated learning episodes in transmission chains
using an Iterated Learning framework.
Chapter 5
Transmission chains
In Chapter 4, we established that simulated e-puck learner agents can successfully
learn the L/R dancing task from an expert agent after interacting for a sufficient amount
of time. Our goals in this chapter are the following:
A. Show that it is possible to link isolated pair learning instances in cultural transmis-
sion chains;
B. Examine how interaction time affects the stability of these transmission chains.
Since, as we saw, lower learning times led to worse task success rates, we expect
this factor to be a major influence in the stability of the chains.
We will start by detailing the setup of an experiment that will allow us to initialise
and investigate transmission chains. After discussing some characteristic examples of
stable and unstable chains, we will determine how learning time interacts with chain
stability and examine what exactly happens when chains break down. We will close
the chapter by looking at cultural inheritance dynamics in transmission chains.
5.1 Setup
A transmission chain starts with the same setup we described in section 4.2.1: two
simulated e-puck agents, an expert A0 (a preset agent that always turns either to the
left or to the right on proximity detection) and a learner A1 (an agent that uses the “tag
& reward” algorithm to learn the correct behaviour). Again, the two agents are placed
opposite each other, outside proximity range, and are left to interact for tlearn. Every
treset = 15 seconds, both agents are reset to their starting positions (Fig. 4.9a). Dancing
is rewarded with DAr = 1 while crashing is punished with DAp = −0.5. The neural
network used for the learning agents is the same as the one used for the experiments
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Figure 5.1: A joint action transmission chain. A pair of teacher-learner agents inter-
act, with the teacher removed in each successive generation and the previous learner
interacting as a teacher with a new learner. This process is repeated for N generations.
in Chapter 4, seen in Fig. 4.5. Initial weights are w12 = w13 = 2, w23 = w32 =−2 and
w24 = w35 = 5.
At the end of the interaction time tlearn, the expert agent A0 is removed and a new
learner agent A2 is introduced; the previous learner agent A1 now assumes the role
of the teacher and the agents are left to interact for a further tlearn. This process of
gradually replacing agents while alternating learning and teaching roles for each agent
is repeated for N generations (Fig. 5.1). The lifetime of each agent is thus 2 · tlearn,
except for the initial expert agent A0 and the last agent AN−1 who lack the learning and
teaching phases respectively, so their lifetimes are tlearn. An algorithmic flowchart of
the process is shown in Fig. 5.2.
Note that nothing internal to the agent changes when they assume the role of a
teacher rather than a learner. In a way, there is “lifelong learning” as even when an
agent is teaching, the learning algorithm is still functioning and the agent’s synaptic
weights can still change via reward or punishment. The only difference between the
learning and teaching phases of an agent is how long the agent has been active for and
whether their partner is “older” or “younger” than themselves.
This is a departure from the usual Iterated Learning models. In the simulation ex-
periments (Section 2.2.1.1), the training and teaching phases are completely separate;
once an agent becomes a teacher, the learning process stops. In the case of human
experiments (Section 2.2.1.2), there is no contact between “teachers” and “learners”.
The subjects only operate as teachers implicitly, when the language they produce is
used by the experimenters to train the next generation of participants.
However, we feel that this decision is in line with the “simplest approach” method-
ology we have adopted; switching between completely different teaching and learning
behaviours requires further assumptions than letting the agents to continue learning
even as teachers, so such a design decision would have to be justified. Furthermore,
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Figure 5.2: A flowchart of the transmission chain process. Pairs of agents interacting
alternate between learning and teaching roles for N generations; in each generation,
the older agent is replaced by a new learning agent.
as we will see later on in this chapter, “lifelong learning” allows agents to exhibit
complex and interesting behaviour that would be otherwise suppressed if the agents
stopped learning when they switched to their teaching role.
If all instances in this process of transmission are successful, by the end of the
chain of agents the behaviour of the initial expert agent (“Right” or “Left” for R-
experts and L-experts accordingly) should be preserved. As opposed to the isolated
pair experiments, however, this time the teachers are not expert, pre-set agents that
always react with a consistent response; instead, they are learners from the previous
generation (with an exception, of course, for the initial agent A0 starting the chain). In
the next section we will see a number of transmission chain examples: some stable,
some breaking down in different ways.
5.2 Examples of transmission chains
Fig. 5.3 shows five examples of different transmission chains resulting from the experi-
mental setup we described. In all five cases the chains were run for N = 10 generations;
the initial agent in cases (a), (d) and (e) was an R-expert and in cases (b) and (c) an
L-expert. For each agent, we recorded the mean response rate for each possible be-
haviour (“Right”, “Left”, “None”) over the last 2 minutes of its learning period (in
other words, over the last two minutes of tlearn, the agent’s first half of its lifetime; the
other half being its teaching role).
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(a) The most straightforward case is a working example of a stable chain for tlearn =
20m (Fig. 5.3a). With such a long learning time, each agent’s neural network is
very likely to reach w = wmax for the connective pathway that leads to the correct
response. This means that all agents’ behaviour is very robust, leading to a stable
chain. While not very interesting, this example establishes that transmission chains
are indeed possible in our system.
(b) The chain shown in Fig. 5.3b (tlearn = 12m) breaks down after 5 generations. For
the rest of the chain after this breakdown, neither of the agents in each pair is
proficient at the task; the agents, then, do not have anyone to learn from and revert
to chance-level responses for generations 6 to 9. While the task success rate falls
below 100% on generation 2, it does not drop further to chance-level rates; instead,
it increases back to 100%, recovering the chain before its eventual collapse.
(c) Fig. 5.3c (tlearn = 10m) is another example of a successful chain recovery. While
agents A3 and A4 drop to very low task success rates, agent A5 reverses this drop
and the chain remains stable until the end of the experiment. This is an example
of the learners’ ability to regularise and perform better than their teachers.
(d) On the other hand, Fig. 5.3d (tlearn = 12m) is an example of a stable chain that sus-
tains a success rate lower than 100%. Learners in this chain do not regularise (in-
creasing the success rate back to 100%) but instead seem to be probability match-
ing by adopting similar success rates as their teachers. We will return to discuss
regularising and probability matching behaviour later in this chapter.1
(e) Finally, Fig. 5.3e (tlearn = 10m) showcases an interesting case of behaviour switch-
ing: the transmission chain breaks down as soon as generation 5, but straight after
the breakdown, both agents (A5 and A6) happen to turn in the same direction, op-
posite to the one the chain was initialised with. This leads to “Left” behaviour
being reinforced instead of “Right”, even though there was never any L-expert in
the chain. This new “Left” chain persists for 3 generations, after which point it
also breaks down. We will examine behaviour emergence in detail in Chapter 6.
1We are borrowing this terminology from Hudson Kam and Newport (2005).




Figure 5.3: Five different transmission chain behaviours (N = 10 generations). R-expert
initial agent in cases (a), (d) and (e) and L-expert in (b) and (c). (a): Stable chain with
consistent 100% success rate; tlearn = 20m. (b): Chain breakdown after 5 generations;
tlearn = 12m. (c): Task success rate drops after 3 generations but the drop is reversed
and a breakdown prevented; tlearn = 10m. (d): Stable chain with < 100% success rate;
tlearn = 12m. (e): Chain breakdown after 4 gen. with behaviour swap; tlearn = 10m.
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5.3 Learning time and chain stability
As we saw in section 4.2.3, shorter learning times in isolated expert/learner pairs of
agents lead to lower task success rates. It makes sense, then, that shorter chain interac-
tion times will increase the odds of a chain breaking down in any given generation. In
order to investigate this effect, we ran 10 transmission chain experiments, half of which
were initialised with an R-expert (the other half being initialised with an L-expert) for
a number of tlearn values ranging from 1 to 20 minutes. After each generation, we kept
track of which of the chains had broken down (which we defined as having task success
rates lower than 60%). The results are plotted in Fig. 5.4.
We can see a clear trend in the data: for any given generation, lower learning times
lead to higher chain failure rates.2 Almost all of the chains with tlearn = 1m fail instantly
(from generation 1), while chains with tlearn = 3m or 5m mostly fail by generation 3.
As the learning times increase, the fail rate curves grow less and less steep, becoming
completely flat for 15m and 20m learning times (as none of those chains fail before the
end of the experiments).
A better view of this trend is given by the half-life plot (Fig. 5.5). The half-life
score associated with chains of a given learning time value tlearn is defined as the gen-
eration by which half of those chains have broken down. (The 12, 15 and 20 minutes
tlearn chains do not have half-life scores, as more than half of the chains were still stable
by the end of the experiments.) Again, Fig. 5.5 shows that longer learning times lead
to more stable chains on average, an expected result that validates the hypothesis in the
beginning of this chapter.
A more surprising result is the failure rate of 12m learning time chains: by gen-
eration 9, 4 out of the 10 chains have broken down. In the isolated pair learning ex-
periments (Chapter 4), agents learning for tlearn = 12m had a 99% success rate (Fig.
4.12d), the same as agents learning for 20m; when linking the isolated experiments
into chains, however, the shorter learning time seems to be making a difference. To
investigate this effect we need to take a closer look into the agent interaction that leads
to a chain breaking down.
2Note that for very short learning times of 1, 3 and 5 minutes the failure rate is calculated over the
last 1 minute of agents’ learning period, while for longer chains the failure rate is calculated over the
last 2 minutes.
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Figure 5.4: Chain fail rate by generation (lower is better). “Failed” chains are chains
whose agent success rates have fallen below 60%. All of the chains with tlearn = 1m fail
from the 1st generation; none of the chains with tlearn = 15m and 20m have failed by
the end of the experiment (10th generation). Between these two extreme values, there
is a clear trend of longer learning times leading to more stable chains.
Figure 5.5: Half-life graph for chains of various learning times tlearn. The half-life score
is the generation by which at least half of the chains with tlearn have broken down. 12,
15 and 20 minutes tlearn chains do not have half-life scores as more than half of the
chains were still stable by the end of the experiments. Again, there is a clear trend of
longer learning times leading to more stable chains.
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5.4 Chain breakdowns
Fig. 5.6a is a plot of the success rates in one of the 12 minute learning time chains
that break down. Generations 1 to 4 seem to be stable with very high success rates;
the success rate of agent A5, however, suddenly drops to 54%. In order to understand
the cause of this drop, we need to look at a measure internal to the agents: the wL/wR
ratio. This ratio, calculated after each agent’s learning time, is a measure of the strength
of the connective pathway leading to “Left” behaviour (1→ 3→ 5) compared to the
strength of the pathway leading to “Right” behaviour (1→ 2→ 4). A high ratio leads
to very stable “Left” responses from the agent, while a ratio close to 1 leads to an equal
number of “Right” and “Left” responses.
The weight ratio in the above chain (Fig. 5.6b) starts high but falls abruptly in
generation 2, and even further in generation 4. This is not reflected in the agents’ task
success rates: any ratio above a certain threshold leads to consistent behaviour. It does,
however, affect their teaching ability and especially their resilience to “uncooperative”
learners. (We place “uncooperative”, here, in brackets as there is nothing inherent in
the learning agent that makes them less cooperative in their learning role; the only
stochastic element in the system is the noise, both internal to the neural network and
external as part of the proximity sensors, and it is only “bad luck” that makes it so
that a learning agent repeatedly produces the wrong response. In that way, a better
description would be “unlucky” instead of “uncooperative” agents.)
Fig. 5.7 shows an overlapping timeline of the interaction between agents A2 to A6
in the same transmission chain. The weights of the agents change as they are rewarded
or punished, both during their learning and teaching phases. (The weights shown are
not individual weights, but rather combined weights for each connective pathway; wR
for the pathway leading to “Right” responses and wL for the one leading to “Left”
responses.) The switch between phases is indicated by vertical bars, while the coloured
dots are points in time at which an agent’s response does not lead to successful dancing;
since the initial direction of this specific chain is “left”, these incorrect responses are
“right” (red dots) and “none” (blue dots).
The first two agents shown, A2 and A3, are successful as both learners and teachers.
At the end of their learning period (minutes 12 & 24 respectively) they have high task
success rates and their wL/wR weight ratios, while not very high, are above 1.5. During
their teaching periods, both agents always respond correctly (“left”) and by the end of
their lifetime the weights of the connections leading to this response reach wmax.
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Figure 5.6: A tlearn = 12m chain breaking down. (a): Task success rates (in this specific
chain, “Left” response rates) are high for the first 4 generations then suddenly fall below
60%. (b): The weight ratio wL/wR is a measure of the strength of the connective
pathway leading to “Left” behaviour compared to the strength of the pathway leading
to “Right” behaviour. The weight ratio starts high, but falls abruptly in generation 2 and
even further in generation 4. This is not reflected in the agents’ task success rates but
it affects their teaching ability. Both success rate and weight ratios correspond to the
learning role of each agent.
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This changes, however, with agent A4: while at the end of the learning period
A4’s task success rate is 100%, its wL/wR weight ratio is very low (= 1.29). This is
reflected in A4’s performance as a teacher: paired with the uncooperative agent A5,
agent A4 produces the wrong response on a number of occasions (shown as red and
blue points in Fig. 5.7). This can have the effect of further decreasing the teacher’s
own weight ratio if the learning agent happens to produce the same response that leads
to successful dancing in the “wrong” direction. Regardless of whether this happens
or not, however, the inconsistency in the teacher’s behaviour leads to low task success
rates at the end of agent A5’s learning period. This further leads to both learning and
teaching deficiencies for the next agents A6 and A7, the weight ratios of which get
even closer to 1. The agent’s responses become increasingly random and the chain
eventually breaks down.
It seems, then, that there is a trait inherited from generation to generation of agents
that is not reflected in the task success rates: an agent can be a good “learner” but a bad
“teacher”.3 This answers the question we posed at the end of section 5.3 and explains
how a learning time of tlearn = 12m leads to perfect task success rates in isolated learn-
ing experiments (Fig. 4.13a) but is not enough for long-term stable chains (Fig. 5.4).
In the next section we will take a closer look at the inheritance of both task success
rates and weight ratios in transmission chains.
5.5 Cultural inheritance dynamics
Single chain plots, like the ones shown in Fig. 5.3, cannot be used to identify any
trends in the transmission from generation to generation. In order to do that, we will
look at cultural inheritance dynamics plots, state plots of a certain measure (in our
case, success rate or weight ratio) inherited from one generation of agents to the next
in transmission chains. Each point in the plot represents a transmission episode, the
x-coordinate being the measure of the teacher (generation N) and the y-coordinate
the equivalent measure of the learner (generation N+1). Fig. 5.8 shows a number of
success rate inheritance plots for chains of various learning times. Each plot includes
data from 10 separate chain experiments of the same learning time; each of those
chain experiments use 9 learning agents, which means that there are 8 episodes of
3We used the weight ratio as a measure of the teaching ability of an agent, but a number of other
measures could be used instead. One obvious example would be the count of “wrong” responses an
agent produces during their teaching period; this has the advantage of being a behavioural measure, but
it cannot be estimated before an agent actually goes through that teaching period.
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Figure 5.7: A series of graphs showing the interaction between agents A2 to A6 in a
transmission chain. The weights of each agent, as they change while learning, are
shown in the plotted lines; wR is the combined weight of the connective pathway that
leads to “Right” responses and wL is the equivalent combined weight for “Left” re-
sponses. Vertical bars indicate the switch between learning and teaching roles. The
coloured dots are points in time at which an agent’s response does not lead to success-
ful dancing (“right” responses in red and “none” responses in blue). The decreasing
wL/wR weight ratio (A4) leads to teachers that are less robust to uncooperative learn-
ers (A5); eventually, the weight ratio becomes too low and the chain breaks down after
agent A6.
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transmission, for a total of 80 data points per plot. Some observations:
1. The diagonal line drawn on each plot is the identity line (x = y) and it represents
a perfect transmission of task success rates from teacher to learner. Unless the
chain is perfectly stable, as in the case of the tlearn = 20m chains where all agents
have success rates of 1, most transmission points deviate from this line. Points
below the line (x > y) represent the chain’s success rate decreasing, since the
success rate of generation N is higher than that of the next generation. Points
above the line (x < y) represent the success rate increasing.
2. Stable chains are represented by points in the upper right corner of each plot. In
perfect chains (tlearn = 20m) all points converge to (x,y) = (1,1); stable but not
perfect chains (tlearn = 15m) include points with x = 1, y < 1 (drops in success
rate) but also symmetric points with x < 1, y = 1 which indicate recoveries (Fig.
5.8a). Chains that have broken down are represented by points in the area around
(x,y) = (0.5,0.5). The spread of these points however is high, since as we saw
in section 4.2.3 (Fig. 4.12a) the responses of agents that operate at chance levels
have high variance.
3. Vertical groups of points with x = 1 (Fig. 5.8b) represent success rates drop-
ping from 100% to various lower values; horizontal groups of points with y = 1
(Fig. 5.8c) represent success rates increasing to 100% from various lower val-
ues. These groups are only present in chains with learning times high enough to
have non-expert agents with 100% success rates but low enough to reliably drop
from these high rates (tlearn = 10 to 12m).
Fig. 5.9 shows a number of inheritance plots, this time of weight ratios instead of
success rates. Again, each plot includes data from 10 separate chain experiments of
the same learning time. The weight ratio we used for these plots was, as before, the
wL/wR ratio. This time, however, since half of the chains of each learning time started
with an R-expert, successful chains do not only correspond to high weight ratio values.
Instead, successful “Right” agents have weight ratios that are much lower than 1, while
successful “Left” agents have weight ratios that are much higher than 1. In order to
accurately depict the difference between ratios, the plots are in logarithmic scale. Once
again, some observations:
1. Low learning times (tlearn = 1, 3 and 5 minutes) lead to agents with small synap-
tic weight differences and wL/wR ≈ 1. Inheritance data points are gathered
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Figure 5.8: Success rate inheritance dynamics plots for chains of various learning times
(state plots of the success rates inherited from one generation of agents to the next in
transmission chains). Each point represents a transmission episode, the x-coordinate
being the success rate of the teacher (generation N) and the y-coordinate the success
rate of the learner (generation N+1). The diagonal identity line in each plot represents
a perfect transmission of task success rates. Points below the identity line are drops
in success rate, while points above the line are recoveries. (a): Points in the upper
right corner indicate stable chains; each “drop” point is balanced out by a symmetric
“recovery” point. (b,c): Vertical groups of points represent moments at which success
rates drop from 100% to various lower values; horizontal groups represent recoveries
to 100%.
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Figure 5.9: Weight ratio inheritance dynamics plots for chains of various learning times.
Each point represents a transmission episode, the x-coordinate being the wL/wR weight
ratio of the teacher (generation N) and the y-coordinate the wL/wR weight ratio of the
learner (generation N+1). The plots are in logarithmic scale. (a): Chains with very low
learning times break down instantly and operate at chance levels, with wL ≈ wR for all
generations; all inheritance data points are gathered around the (x,y) = (1,1) attractor.
(b): As learning time increases, two additional attractors appear in the upper right (“Left”
behaviour) and bottom left (“Right” behaviour) corners.
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around the (x,y) = (1,1) attractor, with all chains failing quickly and agents
reverting to chance response levels (Fig. 5.9a).
2. As learning time increases, the inheritance data points get pulled apart into the
corners of the plot, indicating two new “successful chains” attractor points:
“Right” in the lower left corner and “Left” in the upper right corner. Most
tlearn = 10m chains fail by generation 9 (Fig. 5.4) and all agents of those chains
end up in the (1,1) attractor. For tlearn = 12m, however, the inheritance data
points start getting drawn into the two new “Right” and “Left” attractors. Fi-
nally, for longer learning times (tlearn = 15 and 20 minutes), only the two stable
“Right” and “Left” attractors remain; the weight difference is significant enough
that none of the chains break down (Fig. 5.9b).
3. In comparison to the task success rate inheritance plots (Fig. 5.8), the inheritance
data points in the weight ratio plots appear closer to the “perfect transmission”
identity line. We can confirm that this is the case by comparing the R2 score
of the “fit” of the x = y line for the points of each of the two conditions.4 The
distance for each of the learning times is given in Table 5.1 below; “SR” stands
for success rate while “WR” is the weight ratio.
1m 3m 5m 7m 10m 12m 15m 20m
SR -1.2269 -0.9449 -0.8894 -0.3604 0.1025 -0.2467 -0.7068 1.0000
WR -1.2068 -1.6615 -0.5618 0.2502 0.2221 0.6204 0.6995 0.9459
Table 5.1: R2 scores for success rate (SR) and weight ratio (WR) inheritance data
points. These scores show how good the fit of the x = y line is to the data points; a
good fit (with an R2 score closer to 1) indicates a tendency of learners to more closely
match their teachers.
For very short learning times (1, 3 and 5 minutes), the negative numbers indicate
that the x = y identity line is a very bad fit for the inheritance data points: high
variance leads to very low inheritance from one generation to the next for both
success rates and weight ratios. This, in fact, continues to be the case across
4The R2 score is given by calculating the mean squared vertical distance of all points from the x = y
line; dividing it by the mean squared vertical distance from a horizontal line going through the mean
y value of all points; and subtracting this quotient from 1. Note that despite the “R2” is not actually
squared; it can be a negative number if the fit is bad enough.
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all learning times for the success rates, indicating that learning agents do not
tend to match the success rates of their teachers. (As an exception, all agents for
tlearn = 20m have success rates equal to 100%, which leads to all the inheritance
points being on the x = y line and a perfect R2 score of 1.) The comparatively
higher R2 scores for weight ratios for learning times of 7, 12 and 15 minutes,
however, show that agents tend to match the weight ratios of their teachers more
than their success rate.
5.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we documented an experiment that put together isolated pair learning
episodes (as described in Chapter 4) in cultural transmission chains. After demonstrat-
ing a number of different examples of such chains (some stable, some breaking down)
we examined the connection of agent learning time to chain stability; detailed the in-
teractions between agents that lead to chains breaking down; and looked at the cultural
inheritance dynamics of the transmission chains. Before moving on to the next chapter,
let us make some brief comments related to the experiments we have described so far.
Stable chains are possible: The stable chain examples for learning times of tlearn =
15 and 20 minutes are cultural transmission chains that show similarities to the
chimpanzee transmission chains (Horner et al., 2006) we mentioned in Chapter
2: an agent trained in accomplishing a task using one of two possible behaviours
(“Right”, “Left”) transmits this initial behaviour to posterior generations using a
process of iterated learning through joint action. This effectively demonstrates
the claim we put forward in section 2.3: it is possible to build a system that is
consistent with an autopoietic approach to cognition and able to exhibit a chain
of cultural transmission of behaviour. In Chapter 7, we will return to this point
and examine it in relation to the autopoietic design points that we discussed in
Section 2.1.2.2.
Teaching vs. learning: An interesting point that emerged through the chain experi-
ments is that an agent’s performance as a learner is not necessarily indicative of
their performance as a teacher. For a given learning time, the learner success
rates can be perfect (as we saw in section 4.2.3, Fig. 4.13a for learning times of
12 minutes); using these learners as teachers for the next generation, however,
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leads to transmission chains that often break down (Fig. 5.4). We can iden-
tify two reasons that may cause this difference between an agent’s learning and
teaching abilities.
The first reason is the small sample size we use for our calculation of an agent’s
post-learning task success rate. We are calculating this success rate over the
last 2 minutes of learning time; while learning, agents are reset to their initial
positions after 15 seconds, which means that those last 2 minutes correspond to
8 interaction attempts, a sample size that might not be enough to identify smaller
changes in task success rates. On the other hand, the results shown in Fig. 4.13a
are calculated over 50 different experiments, effectively increasing the sample
size to a point where even a small difference in response percentage would be
visible.
A more plausible explanation is that a thresholding effect is applied to the agents’
success rates. All weight ratios5 above a certain threshold lead to ceiling success
rates for a learner; further weight ratio increases are not visible when using suc-
cess rate as a measure. During an agent’s teaching role, however, uncooperative
students often produce responses that lead to crashes. Since the teacher agent
never stops learning, these crashes decrease the weights of the “correct” neural
pathway, bringing in turn the teacher’s weight ratio closer to 1. If the ratio was
already close enough to 1, this further change might be enough to influence the
teacher’s correct response rates. At that point, as we saw in Fig. 5.7, the lower
weight ratios eventually lead to the chain breaking down.
Probability matching vs. regularisation: A further question arising from the trans-
mission chain results in this chapter is whether learning agents tend to inherit
task success rates similar to their teachers, making them probability matchers,
or tend to drive success rates towards binary values of success (100%) or failure
(50%), making them regularisers (Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005).
This is an interesting question, as it has some parallels with language learning;
when presented with variable forms in a language where their use is probabilistic
rather than predictable, adult learners tend to produce those forms with the same
probability they appear in the learned language (“probability matching”, while
5We have been using the weight ratio wL/wR as a “biological”, internal measure of how consistent
an agent is in producing the right response to a stimulus; any other equivalent internal measure would
be equally usable instead.
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child learners tend to “regularise”, producing only the form that appears with the
highest probability (Smith and Wonnacott, 2010). (Once more, we will revisit
this discussion in section 7.6.)
In any case, the weight inheritance plots seem to suggest that agents tend to
regularise for success rates: vertical groups with x = 1 and horizontal groups
with y = 1 (as shown in Fig. 5.8b and c respectively) represent drastic decreases
and increases of success rates from and to 100%.
On the other hand, there are also examples of success rate matching (such as the
chain shown in Fig. 5.3d). In order to get a clearer picture, we need to look
at how stable longer probability matching chains are; we also need to look at
what happens over time to chains that have broken down. In order to do that,
10-generation chains are not enough; we will return to this topic after looking at
longer chains in the following chapter.
Learning, maintenance, construction: In a study of how learning biases determine
the type of communication systems afforded by an iterated learning chain in
a population of agents, Smith (2002) classifies the agents in three categories.
Learners are agents that successfully learn a communication system; maintain-
ers are agents that successfully maintain a communication system in an iterated
learning chain; and constructors are agents that successfully evolve a communi-
cation system starting from random behaviour. These categories are not mutu-
ally exclusive, but form hierarchical sets: all constructors are maintainers and all
maintainers are learners (but not the other way around).
Borrowing Smith’s terminology, how can we classify our agents?6 In Chapter
4, we demonstrated that they can be learners, as they can successfully learn to
produce the correct response to a certain stimulus. In this chapter, we demon-
strated that they can be maintainers, as they can form stable transmission chains
that propagate a certain type of dancing behaviour from generation to generation,
given long enough learning time.
However, “behaviour swapping” examples (as shown in Fig. 5.3e) indicate that
the agents could also be constructors, able to “discover” dancing behaviour even
without an expert agent to teach them. In the following chapter, we will set up
6Note that the specifics of Smith’s experiments are very different from ours; we are only borrowing
the agent classification terminology.
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a series of experiments in order to investigate whether dancing behaviour can
emerge (and be transmitted) in the absence of an initial expert agent.
Effect of weight saturation: One aspect of the learning algorithm that potentially
plays an important role in the system’s behaviour is the maximum weight cap,
wmax, which, if reached by any of the synaptic connections in the neural net-
work, stops all other connections from further increasing (Section 4.1.1, “Weight
changes”). This does not directly influence the agents’ learning success rates per
se, as evidenced in Fig. 5.7 in agents A2 & A3, the learning success rates tend to
reach 100% before any of the weights reach wmax and are stopped from further
increasing (this happens after around 20 minutes for both agents).
What it can potentially influence, however, is how protected (or resilient) teach-
ers are against “uncooperative” learners; a higher maximum weight ratio pro-
vides a larger “buffer” for weight ratio decreases before they actually influence
an agent’s behaviour. In this way, a higher value of wmax can lead to slower fail
rates for transmission chains; the qualitative results we have discussed in this
chapter, however, should remain the same. We will return to the discussion of
the weight update mechanism and teacher resilience in Chapter 7 (Section 7.5).
Chapter 6
Behaviour emergence
In Chapters 4 and 5 we saw that simulated e-puck agents using the “tag & reward”
learning algorithm can successfully learn the joint action L/R dancing task from an
expert teacher; and that they can successfully maintain the expert’s initial behaviour
by passing it on from generation to generation, forming a transmission chain. Of the
many open questions remaining from the experiments described in those chapters, we
drew attention to two:
1. Can agents “discover” left or right dancing behaviour in the absence of an initial
expert teacher?
2. Do agents tend to regularise, driving behaviour response rates to binary values
of “success” (100% rates) or “failure” (50% rates)? Or do they tend to match
their teachers’ response rates?
In an attempt to give answers to these questions, in this chapter we will describe
two experiments: one with the aim of finding out if behaviour emergence is possible
(and if so, under what circumstances); the other with the aim of identifying trends in
longer transmission chains.
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6.1 Behaviour emergence
6.1.1 Setup
Any spontaneous “discovery” of one of the two possible dancing behaviours will hap-
pen in the context of an isolated pair of agents interacting; for this first behaviour
emergence experiment, then, we will use two agents, both of them “naive” (not pro-
ficient at the dancing task), that interact for an extended period of time. The setup
of the experiment is mostly identical to the isolated pair experiments we described in
Chapter 4: two simulated e-puck agents (A0 and A1) are placed facing each other (but
not in sensory range of each other) and left to interact for a period of time tlearn. Every
treset = 15s they are returned to those original positions (Fig. 4.9a); as before, success-
ful dancing is rewarded with DAr = 1 and crashing is punished with DAp =−0.5.
The main difference in this experiment compared to the previous isolated pair ex-
periments is that both agents are learners; there is no expert agent teaching a specific
behaviour. Each learner is controlled by the simple neural network shown in Fig.
4.5; the weights of the network (initially set to w12 = w13 = 2, w24 = w35 = 5 and
w23 = w32 =−2) are updated using the “tag & reward” learning algorithm detailed in
section 4.1.
Another difference is the extended interaction time; we selected an initial value
of tlearn = 1 hour to see how many (if any) pairs of agents would discover dancing in
that time frame. We repeated the 1-hour interaction experiment for 60 isolated pairs
of agents; for each of the agents, we recorded the rate of all three possible responses
(“Right”, “Left”, “None”) as well as the weight of each connection across the interac-
tion time.
(Note that in this chapter, since there is no “correct” initial behaviour, we switch
our terminology from “agent success rates” to “agent response rates”.)
6.1.2 Examples of behaviour emergence
All of the 60 agent pairs ended up discovering dancing behaviour in the 1 hour of
interaction; the time this took each pair ranged from quick (10 minutes or less) to slow
(more than 40 minutes). The type of behaviour discovered was balanced: 27 (45%) of
the pairs discovered “Right” dancing and 33 (55%) discovered “Left” (the two-tail P
value of this outcome, given an equal probability for each direction, is 0.5190).
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.1: Two examples of non-expert agent pairs discovering dancing behaviour. The
upper charts show the mean response rates of the first agent of each pair, calculated
over 20 episodes of interaction: one pair discovers dancing around 15 minutes (a), the
other pair around 40 minutes (b). The lower charts (c,d) show the cumulative weights of
the two different connective pathways leading to “Right” (wR) and “Left” (wL) response.
In both agent pairs, a initial period of “random walk” for all weights eventually leads to a
chance event strengthening one of the weights more and to a learning feedback loop.
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Fig. 6.1a and 6.1b show charts of the mean response rates of the first agent out of
two different pairs that discover dancing (the response rates for the other agent of each
pair follow identical patterns). The mean response rates are calculated over a rolling
window of 20 episodes of interaction between the agents; only the “Right” and “Left”
responses are shown, with “None” being omitted for clarity (null responses did not
have any impact on the results). In the first pair of agents, behaviour emerges quite
quickly (after around 15 minutes of interaction, Fig. 6.1a); the second pair of agents is
an example of slower emergence (after around 40 minutes of interaction, Fig. 6.1b).
Fig. 6.1c and 6.1d show the changes in the cumulative weights of the two con-
nective pathways leading to “Right” (wR) and “Left” (wL) responses. (Once more, the
weights shown correspond to the first agent of each pair; the second agent’s weights
change in a similar way.) Both cases follow the same pattern; since agent responses are
initially random, the weights of the pathways leading to either R or L response change
in a “random walk” while keeping a weight ratio close to 1. When noise makes both
agents turn in the same direction, all connections are strengthened; when they turn in
opposite directions and crash, they are weakened. The weight increases are slightly
more significant for the relevant connections that lead to the agents dancing, but with-
out a steady response in either one or the other direction that would be provided by an
expert agent, the total weights stay similar across all connections.
At some point, however, one of the weights happens to increase significantly more
than its competitor. This could be due to repeated chance episodes of both agents turn-
ing in the same direction and dancing, or to an uncommonly quick dancing interaction
between the two agents that leads to a quicker reward, changing the relevant weights
more significantly. Regardless of the cause, this chance event creates a learning feed-
back loop that causes one behaviour to become more probable for both agents, both of
which end up learning that behaviour even in the absence of a proper teacher.
6.1.3 Interaction time effect on emergence speed
Since the kind of behaviour emergence we described is caused by a chance event, it
can happen at any point in time. We already saw two examples in which behaviour
emerged at 15 and 40 minutes and mentioned that all of the 60 pairs in our experiment
were dancing by the end of 1 hour of interaction. How long, however, can we usually
expect a pair of agents to interact for before dancing behaviour emerges?
In Fig. 6.2, we provide an answer to this question by graphing the percentage of
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Figure 6.2: A graph of the percentage of 60 agent pairs that have discovered dancing at
any given time point. (We count a pair as “dancing” if any response rate is higher than
90%). Both agents are non-expert. The first dancing behaviour emergence happens at
t = 8m; after t = 22m dancing has emerged in more than half of the pairs; after t = 47m
in all of them.
pairs that have discovered dancing at a given time point in the interaction. (We identify
a pair as “dancing” when either the “Right” or “Left” mean response rates of the paired
agents in the last 2 minutes are higher than 90%.) The first pair to discover dancing
does so at t = 8m, while all pairs are dancing after t = 47m; between these two times,
there seems to be a linear increase in the dancing behaviour emergence. After t = 22m
more than half of the 60 pairs have discovered dancing.
These results seem to suggest that, given enough attempts, dancing behaviour will
eventually emerge even in agent pairs that interact for shorter times. Long transmission
chains, like the ones we will examine in our next experiment, provide plenty of such
attempts (albeit in a serial, not parallel way): even without a starting expert agent, then,
long chains could lead to the emergence and maintenance of dancing behaviour. We
will return to discuss this at the end of this chapter.
Before we go on to the next experiment, one last comment to make would be that
since behaviour emergence depends on the weight difference of the two connective
pathways wR and wL reaching a critical threshold, changing the values of dopamine
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Figure 6.3: Plot of the percentage of agent pairs that have discovered dancing (iden-
tified by a maximum response rate of at least 80%) as a function of interaction time.
Stronger punishment values lead to slower emergence of dancing.
rewards and punishments (DAr, DAp) allows us to manipulate how quickly a given
pair of agents tends to discover dancing behaviour. Indeed, a test using 20 pairs of
agents in each of four different reward conditions (DAr, DAp pairs of 1,−0.5; 1,−1;
0.5,−0.5; 0.5,−1) showed a trend of slower emergence for lower reward and higher
punishment values. In all four conditions, however, all pairs of agents discovered
dancing behaviour by the end of a 1-hour interaction.
Fig. 6.3 shows a plot of the percentage of agent pairs that have discovered dancing
(identified by a maximum response rate of at least 80%) as a function of interaction
time. In the condition where punishment is stronger than reward (DAR = 0.5, DAP =
−1), dancing behaviour takes longer to emerge; still, even in that condition, almost all
of the pairs have discovered dancing after 1 hour of interaction.
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6.2 Long chains without experts
For the second part of this chapter, we will combine emergent behaviour, learning and
transmission chains (or “construction”, “learning” and “maintenance” in the terminol-
ogy used by Smith, 2002) in a single experiment, in order to find out if stable emergent
behaviour chains are possible in a transmission chain without experts. As we men-
tioned at the end of Chapter 5, we will also use longer chains in order to investigate
potential probability matching or regularising biases that the agents might have.
6.2.1 Setup
The setup of this experiment is very similar to the chain experiments that we described
in section 5.1: two agents A0 and A1 (both simulated e-pucks) are initially placed
opposite each other but outside proximity sensor range and left to interact for tlearn.
Every treset = 15s the agents are reset to their starting position. After the interaction
time tlearn has passed, agent A0 is replaced with a new agent A2, and agents A1 and
A2 are left to interact for a further tlearn. This procedure is repeated for a number of
generations N (Fig. 5.2).
The difference with the previous chain experiment is that agent A0 is not an “ex-
pert”, preset agent; all agents are learners with neural networks whose weights are
updated using the “tag & reward” learning algorithm. The dopamine values used for
reward and punishment are, once more, DAr = 1 and DAp =−0.5; the neural network
used is the one shown in Fig. 4.5 with initial weights of w12 = w13 = 2, w24 = w35 = 5
and w23 = w32 =−2. Finally, a further difference is that for this experiment, the trans-
mission process is repeated for a significantly higher number of generations (N = 50
instead of 10).
We ran 8 such transmission chain experiments, 4 using tlearn = 12m and 4 using
tlearn = 15m. The reason we picked these learning time values is that lower values (1
to 10 minutes) lead to “chaotic” chains that both break down very often (Fig. 5.4) and
have a lower chance for each agent pair to discover dancing (Fig. 6.2). On the other
hand, higher values (16 to 20 minutes) lead to very stable chains that quickly discover
dancing and maintain success rates of 100% continuously; neither of those cases is
helpful in trying to understand our agents’ behaviour.
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6.2.2 Examples of emergent chains
All 8 experiments we ran resulted in emergent chains very early (the quickest starting
in generation 2, the slowest in generation 5). Fig. 6.4 shows two examples of emergent
chains. In both cases, the top chart shows the mean response rates in the last 2 minutes
of each agent’s learning role; the bottom chart shows the wL/wR weight ratio (again,
at the end of each agent’s learning role).
(a) Fig. 6.4a (tlearn = 15m) is an example of agents that discover “left” dancing very
quickly (from the 3rd generation) and maintain a stable chain until the end of the
experiment (50th generation). The success rates (“left” response rates) are 100%
across almost all generations; occasional drops from this value are always followed
by recoveries back to 100% rates. There is a lot more variation in the weight ratios,
which seem to “jump around” (although their values consistently remain above 1,
with weight ratios lower than 1.5 coinciding with the success rate drops).
(b) In the chain shown in Fig. 6.4b (tlearn = 12m), the agents again very quickly (gen-
eration 3) discover “left” dancing. The chain this time is a lot less stable; while
success rates are very high (100%, except for a short drop) the chain breaks down
in generation 12. This is followed by a period of non-learning agents with random
responses and weight ratios very close to 1. Around generation 25, the agents “re-
discover” dancing behaviour, this time “right” (in an example of behaviour swap-
ping). This is maintained for around 20 generations and breaks down once more
after generation 45. Interestingly, agents seem to match their teachers’ weight
ratios more closely than in the previous tlearn = 15m example.
6.2.3 Trends in long chains
So far, we covered the first question we posed in the beginning of the chapter by show-
ing that agents can indeed discover (and maintain) dancing behaviour, even in the
absence of an expert agent initialising the transmission chain. Here we will attempt to
answer the second question: do agents tend to be regularisers or to probability match
their teachers?
The previous section’s examples (Fig. 6.4) show a tendency of regularisation in
long chains: the agents maintain the transmission chains with response rates that are
mostly 100%; any drops in response rate are either reversed in recoveries, or lead to
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.4: Two examples of emergent chains. In both cases, the initial agents for
the chains are both learners; the pairs of learners quickly (gen. 3) discover dancing
behaviour (“left” in both examples). (a): For tlearn = 15m, the emergent behaviour is
maintained in a stable chain until the end of the experiment. Occasional drops from
100% response rates are always followed by recoveries. (b): For tlearn = 12m, the
chain is less stable, breaking down in gen. 12. After some generations of non-learning
agents, “right” behaviour emerges, persisting for 20 generations then breaking down.
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(a) tlearn = 12m (b) tlearn = 15m
Figure 6.5: Response rate inheritance dynamics plots for 50 generation long chains
with no expert agents and learning times of 12m (a) and 15m (b). In both cases there
are more points in the top right (green circle, “left” stable chains) and bottom left (red
circle, “right” stable chains) compared to “probability matching” points on the x = y
line. Most drops in response rate (rectangles below the x = y line) are followed by
recoveries (rectangles above the line). In the 15m graph regularising behaviour is more
pronounced; there is no “right” attractor, as “left” behaviour happened to emerge in all
of the 4 chains we ran.
the chain breaking down. This trend is made clearer by looking at the response rates
inheritance dynamics plots (Fig. 6.5) that we introduced in Chapter 5. Each point
in the plot represents an episode of transmission; the x-coordinates are the response
rates for the “teacher” generation N, while the y-coordinates are the response rates
for the “learner” generation N + 1. Fig. 6.5a includes the data from the chains with
tlearn = 12m and Fig. 6.5b the equivalent data for tlearn = 15m.
In both cases, the attractor points in the top right and bottom left corners, indicated
by a green and red circle respectively, represent 100% response rate, stable “left” and
“right” chains. The red line plotted through the points is the x = y identity line, indicat-
ing probability matching agents. The red and green rectangles below the identity line
highlight drops of response rates from 100% in stable chains; the rectangles above the
identity line are equivalent recoveries to 100% response rates.
For learning times of 15 minutes (Fig. 6.5b), the chains are relatively stable. Most
of the transmission episodes are between 100% response rate agents. All drops in
response rate are followed by recoveries; other inheritance patterns are very infrequent.
This is confirmed by looking at the number of inheritance points in each category (Fig.
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Figure 6.6: Frequency comparison for different possible inheritance behaviours (as
identified in Fig. 6.5). 100% stable points are points in the two extreme corners of
the inheritance dynamics plot; drops from 100% are points shown in rectangles below
the x = y line; recoveries to 100% are points shown in rectangles above the x = y line;
probability matching points are points on the x= y line except for (0,0) and (1,1). In both
the 12m and 15m cases, the stable points are more frequent than rate matching and
recoveries are more frequent than drops. (Recoveries include behaviour emergence.)
6.6, 15m): most of the points are stable and there are as many recoveries as drops.
(In fact, the recovery number is slightly higher as it includes the initial discovery of
dancing behaviour.) Note that there is no “right” attractor in Fig. 6.5b; this is because
only “left” behaviour happened to emerge in the 4 chains we ran for tlearn = 15m.
The equivalent response rate inheritance data for the 12 minute chains (Fig. 6.5a)
is harder to interpret visually. By comparing the frequency of inheritance points how-
ever (Fig. 6.6, 12m), we can see that while the “stable chain” points are definitely
fewer compared to the 15m chains, they are still more numerous than the “probability
matching” points that fall close to the x = y identity line. Once more, the number of
drops in response rate is matched by the recoveries. (Again, the number of recoveries
is slightly higher, accounting for the behaviour emergence.)
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6.3 Discussion
In this chapter we demonstrated through two experiments that dancing behaviour can
emerge from non-expert agents interacting for long enough; and that this emerging
behaviour can be maintained in transmission chains. In the next, final chapter we will
take a step back and draw some conclusions from all the experiments we detailed in this
thesis; before that, however, let us make a few short comments based on the findings
of this chapter.
Emergent chains: With the parameters that we have been using, emergent behaviour
chains are inevitable. Even when treating both agents in each pair in a trans-
mission chain as new learners (so in effect, treating each generation as indepen-
dent from the history of the chain, with a chance to discover dancing given by
Fig. 6.2), an interaction time of 5 minutes is enough for an 80% probability of
dancing emerging by generation 30. An interaction of 12 or 15 minutes, as in
the chains we described in this chapter, almost always leads to the discovery of
dancing by generation 20 (Fig. 6.7).
Of course, the generations are not independent as the “teacher” agent in each
pair is influenced by its interaction as a “learner” in the previous generation.
Any such influence that does not lead to response rates higher than 90% is not
visible in the data shown in Fig. 6.2, and will lead to higher probabilities of
emergent chains which in turn translates to quicker behaviour emergence; Fig.
6.7 only gives a lower bound.
Emergence speed: Even accounting for the “hidden” < 90% response rates does not
seem to be enough to explain the speed at which behaviour actually emerges
in the chains generated by our experiments: in most of the chains, emergence
chains appear at (or before) generation 3. As we pointed out in Chapter 6, how-
ever, there is one more “hidden” transmissible factor at play: weight ratios. In
the same way that weight ratios, transmitted from generation to generation as a
hidden trait, can lead to chains suddenly breaking down, they can also lead to
quicker emergence of behaviour.
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Probability matching vs. regularisation: All of the longer chains produced by the
experiment we described in section 6.2 tended to either have high response rates
or break down. Any drops in response rate (especially in the case of the tlearn =
15m chains) were followed by recoveries to high rates, not subsequent matching
of the lower rates. This, along with the inheritance dynamics data shown in Fig.
6.5 and 6.6 seems to once more indicate that agents in the chain experiments
we presented are regularising behaviour, not probability matching their teachers.
We will come back to this discussion in the next chapter.
Behaviour swapping: In Figure 6.4b we can see an example of behaviour swapping;
the initial transmission chain of “left” turning agents eventually breaks down
and, in its place, a chain of “right” turning agents emerges instead. This be-
haviour is a combination of two effects we previously touched upon: the fact
that, for learning times of 12 minutes and less, most transmission chains break
down (see Section 5.4 for a description of the mechanism leading to these break-
downs); and the inevitable emergence of dancing behaviour between learning,
non-expert agents (see Section 6.1.2).
“Behaviour switching” appears when these two behaviours are combined and it
so happens that the new behaviour that emerges is different from the initial one
that broke down; there is nothing systematic leading the agents to switch their
behaviour from “left” to “right” (or vice versa).
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Figure 6.7: Probability of the emergence of dancing across generations for 3 different
interaction times: 5, 12 and 15 minutes. The emergence rates for each interaction times
are calculated from Fig. 6.2. Each pair of agents is treated as independent; any trans-
mission of response rates lower than 90% is not visible in this data, so the probabilities
shown in this graph are a lower bound of the actual probabilities of emergence.
Chapter 7
Discussion and future work
In the previous three chapters we detailed a series of experiments in which we showed
that a population of simulated e-puck agents can learn the joint action “left/right danc-
ing” task (Chapter 4); maintain an initial (“left” or “right”) behaviour in a transmission
chain (Chapter 5); and finally construct “left” or “right” dancing behaviour even in the
absence of an initial expert (Chapter 6).
In this final chapter we will take a step back and discuss the results of all previous
experiments as a whole, relating them to our initial motivation and goals. Through this
discussion we will attempt to clearly delineate the contributions of the work described
in this thesis both for autopoiesis as a theory of cognition and for the Iterated Learn-
ing research project. Finally, we will close with an analysis of the limitations of our
work and proposals for future work that could be based on it, to either address those
limitations or expand its scope.
7.1 Autopoiesis and Iterated Learning
Chapter 2, in addition to providing an introduction to autopoiesis as a non representa-
tional approach to cognition and to the Iterated Learning Model of language evolution
(“ILM”), also contains what is essentially a theoretical contribution: the proposal of
the iterated learning model as a practical approach to an autopoietic explanation of im-
portant structural features of language. In order to combine autopoiesis with iterated
learning, our proposed system removes some components that most iterated learning
experiments have in common.
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The Iterated Learning components we remove are the following:
– Object concepts; these usually correspond to “meanings” in the ILM (Kirby
et al., 2008).
– Lexicon, as a collection of meaning-symbol associations (Smith et al., 2003, p.
375).
– “Function independence” clause (Brighton and Kirby, 2005, p. 13).
Instead, we make the following additions:
+ Context, in the form of a specific joint-action task;
+ A biologically plausible (or at least, biologically informed) form of learning.
Some comments on this approach to Iterated Learning:
Novel contribution: Language (and the act of “languaging”; Maturana, 1978) is a
concept of central importance in autopoiesis. To the best of our knowledge,
however, all autopoietically inspired studies of language focus on theoretical ex-
plorations. These include philosophical extensions (in the “enactive” tradition)
of Maturana’s idea of languaging (Cuffari et al., 2015); a re-framing of concepts
from linguistics (Bottineau, 2008); and a critique of “mainstream linguistics”
(Kravchenko, 2011). (For a more comprehensive list, see Cuffari et al., 2015,
pp. 1090-1091.)
Our approach is novel in that it aims for a bottom-up, practical investigation
in the “understanding by building” tradition (Pfeifer et al., 2005); in addition,
we use a biologically plausible model of learning, adding a layer of ecological
validity to this investigation. Di Paolo’s simulation studies of communication
(Di Paolo, 1997) and social coordination (Di Paolo, 2000) are also examples of
practical approaches, but their focus is not on a linguistic system.
Representations: Although our approach seems to firmly place itself on the non-
representational side of the “representation debate” we mentioned in Chapter
1, it actually provides a constructive viewpoint as it does not discount the use of
representations in human cognition. The only strong claim that we are making
is that representations are grounded in language instead of the other way around.
Moreover, in the combination of autopoiesis and the ILM, we are providing a po-
tential pathway towards language, and in consequence also towards a grounded
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theory of representations. Of course, the question of grounding object concepts
and representations in language is an entirely different research topic that we
have not touched at all in our work (for an example, see Steels, 2012).
Dependence on autopoiesis: While the work in this thesis is motivated by the the-
ory of autopoiesis, the fact remains that there is nothing inherently “autopoi-
etic” about the system we described, apart from its design being informed by
principles stemming from our understanding of autopoiesis. The theory of au-
topoiesis, for the purposes of this thesis, could be replaced with a different non-
representational approach to cognition without substracting from the value of the
results that we have described.
In fact, even if someone completely rejects the arguments of non-representational
theories of cognition in general, an autopoietic approach can be of methodolog-
ical use to the Iterated Learning model in two (related) ways. First, adopting an
autopoietic view forces us to be more rigorous: none of the assumptions that we
make (such as, for example, any assumptions about the function of language)
exist in a vacuum: they influence the rest of the system and must thus be made
explicit. At the same time, by getting rid of as many assumptions as possible
and seeing if the conclusions of Iterated Learning models still hold, we can ex-
amine the boundary conditions of any results and make the Iterated Learning
methodology more robust.
That said, we still believe that the autopoietic approach is an exciting research
direction for cognitive science; and since our results stem directly from the
adoption of an “autopoietic” perspective, they also provide some support to the
methodological value of autopoiesis as a theory of cognition.
First step: There is a long way to go from the model we propose in this thesis to
an Iterated Learning model of language, as the cultural transmission chains we
describe only transmit behaviour, not an evolvable communication system. We
will come back to this at the end of this chapter (section 7.7.1).
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7.2 Experimental framework
The experimental framework we detailed in Chapter 3 is a methodological contribu-
tion: the design and implementation of a system that allows us to run joint action
transmission chain experiments using simulated robots. The following components
are novel contributions:
1. The description of a simulated e-puck agent and a basic environment (Fig. 3.3)
in the form of a custom world file for the Stage simulator (Vaughan, 2008).
2. The implementation (as described in section 3.4.2) of a neural network controller
and a biologically plausible form of reinforcement learning (for learning agents),
as well as a rules-based controller (for expert agents).
3. The description of a joint action task (more specifically, the “left/right dancing
task”) in the form of a reward server, an external “observer” that checks the state
of the simulation and rewards (or punishes) the agents taking part in the task.
4. Finally, a script controller that can remove or add agents to the simulation as
well as move them around in space, thus controlling both learning episodes and
transmission chain experiments.
One advantage of this system is the modularity it provides. Since, as we saw in
Chapter 3, all the system’s components communicate through a common interface
(ROS, Quigley et al., 2009), any of the components can be changed as long as the new
component communicates using the same interface. In this way, the simulated world
or agents can be easily changed (possibly for a more detailed simulator); the task can
be swapped for a completely different one; or new types of experiments can be set up;
all without having to change the rest of the system’s components.
An example of the system’s modularity comes from a contribution we did not men-
tion so far, as we ended up not using it for any of the experiments: a custom ROS
controller for physical e-puck robots, completely interchangeable with the simulated
e-pucks in Stage. This allows us to substitute the simulated e-pucks for physical robots
without the need of any further adjustments. We will return to this topic in section
7.7.4, discussing ideas for the use of physical e-puck robots in transmission chain ex-
periments.
Of course, the most substantive contributions in this thesis are the experiments and
results described in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. We will discuss these in the next sections.
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7.3 Cultural transmission chains “in the wild”
At the end of Chapter 2 (section 2.3), we made the following claim:
It is possible to build a system that is both,
1. Consistent with the non-representational, autopoietic design princi-
ples that we outlined in section 2.1.2.2 and,
2. Able to exhibit a chain of cultural transmission of behaviour.
The results we presented in Chapter 5 confirm this initial claim, as they establish
that a system of agents that keeps clear of representations or object concepts as foun-
dational “building blocks” can indeed generate cultural transmission chains.
Comparing our results to the chimpanzee transmission chain experiment that in-
spired our claim in the first place (Horner et al., 2006), we find a number of similari-
ties:
Task: Both the “chimpanzee chains” and our “robot chains” involve a certain task
(food retrieval and dancing, respectively) that can be solved in two different
ways (sliding or lifting a door for the chimpanzees; dancing right or left for the
robots).
Experts: In both experiments, a transmission chain starts with an “expert” agent,
taught by the experimenters to successfully complete the task consistently in
one of the two possible ways.
Learning & chains: After the initial agent is trained, a second agent learns how to
perform the task from this expert; a third agent learns from the second one, a
fourth from the third, et cetera. This process, repeated for a number of genera-
tions, creates a transmission chain.
We must note, however, that the types of learning are different: the chimpanzees
learn by watching the previous agent in the chain successfully solve the food
retrieval task. This is a form of observational learning: there is no direct interac-
tion between the agents. In contrast, the robots learn by performing the dancing
task with the previous agent in the chain and getting reinforcement in the form
of dopamine “injections” (a form of operant conditioning).
Both types of learning are found in nature (Hoppitt and Laland, 2008); we are,
however, more interested in joint action as, contrary to observational learning,
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it provides a “platform” on which to build a communication system (see section
7.7.1).
Distinct role periods: Both the robot agents and the chimpanzees go through at least
two distinct phases: a phase where they learn a certain behaviour from the pre-
vious agent in the chain, and a phase where they “perform” for the next agent
in the chain to learn (“model” phase in Horner et al., 2006). This happens ei-
ther directly (in the case of the robots interacting) or indirectly (in the case of
chimpanzees observing).
A difference here is that the chimpanzees go through an intermediate phase as
well (“test” phase), in which they are tested for consistent behaviour: only ob-
servers who managed to successfully complete the task 10 times are allowed to
become “teachers” for the next agent (Horner et al., 2006, p. 13879). In the case
of our robots, there is no testing phase: after a set time tlearn each learner adopts
a teaching role, regardless of its success rate at the dancing task.
Behaviour persistence: Finally, the results of both experiments are very similar in
that the original behaviour taught to the expert agent persists in a cultural trans-
mission chain. To illustrate this, we re-formatted the success rates of one of the
stable tlearn = 15m chains that resulted from the experiment we described in sec-
tion 5.1 (Fig. 7.1). Of course, depending on the learning time values chosen,
some of the robot chains fail; and even in stable chains, some of the agents have
success rates significantly lower than 100%.
We have established that cultural transmission chains, an element crucial to all
Iterated Learning approaches, can be built without any assumptions that would be in-
compatible with autopoietic theory. This is a significant result, as it means that we
have accomplished the primary goal of this thesis: a first step towards an autopoietic
account of language evolution through Iterated Learning.
Furthermore, despite the simplicity of all of the components that we made use
of (agent bodies with one type of sensor and actuator; very basic neural networks;
minimal, non-communicative left/right joint action task), our system exhibits complex
behaviour that has interesting parallels with other Iterated Learning research; we will
discuss some of these parallels in the next sections.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7.1: Behaviour persistence in chimpanzee and robot transmission chains.
(a): Two chimpanzee transmission chains, starting with two different initial behaviours
(Horner et al., 2006). Dark shaded areas represent “lifting” behaviour; light shaded
areas are “sliding” behaviour. The initial behaviour in each chain persists for 6 gen-
erations. Each of the chimpanzees go through an observation phase (bold arrows), a
testing phase (“T” boxes) and a model phase (“M” boxes).
(b): Two robot transmission chains, again starting with two different behaviours. Red
areas represent “right” dancing behaviour, green areas represent “left” and blue areas
show null responses. Again, the initial behaviour in each chain persists for 10 genera-
tions.
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7.4 Learning, maintenance, construction
In Chapters 4 and 5, we saw that our e-puck robot agents can be classified as learners
(since they are able to learn the correct dancing behaviour using the “tag & reward”
learning algorithm) and maintainers (since they are able to maintain consistent be-
haviour through generational transmission).1 These two agent attributes, learner and
maintainer, are sufficient to support cultural transmission chains. As we saw in Chap-
ter 6, however, they can also be classified as constructors, since they can discover con-
sistent dancing behaviour from initially random responses.2 The fact that our agents
are constructors is significant for a number of reasons; we will comment on three of
them that are especially relevant.
Emergent social behaviour: In section 3.1.2, we discussed an experiment by Quinn
(2001) in which a genetic algorithm transforms a formerly non-communicative
behaviour into a communicative signal, evolving a communication channel in
a system that initially had none. Quinn (2001, pp. 358-359) stresses the im-
portance of starting from a non-communicative system if we want to provide a
convincing explanation of how communication evolved in the first place.
There is a certain similarity between Quinn’s experiment and the emergence
of dancing in our system. What initially starts as a behaviour that has some
non-social function (“turning around” an object) is transformed into something
different (“dancing”) when placed in a social context. There is no need to explic-
itly include social behaviour in our system; we only need to include a “basic”
behaviour, more easily explainable in evolutionary terms, and “dancing” as a
social behaviour emerges naturally from that.
Fewer assumptions: The fact that two learning agents can “discover” dancing by in-
teracting allows us to discard one of the original assumptions: that somehow,
there is an initial expert dancing agent initialising each transmission chain. By
removing this assumption we are giving a more systemic account: a non-social
behaviour (“turning around”), placed in a social context, leads to the emergence
of a social behaviour (“dancing”). This social behaviour is then maintained in a
1Once more, we are borrowing this terminology —and only the terminology— from Smith (2002).
2We should note here that this is one point where our definition of “constructors” differs from
Smith’s: in his experiment, construction happens through the Iterated Learning chain process; in our
experiments in Chapter 6, the emergence of dancing behaviour happens between two isolated agents,
without the need of a transmission chain.




Breakdowns Type A (10m, 12m) Type C (?)
Type E (1m, 3m, 5m)
No breakdowns Type B (15m, 20m) Type D (?)
Table 7.1: Possible types of societies depending on the presence of emergence, sta-
ble chains and chain breakdowns. Values in brackets are learning times that lead to
societies of a respective type. Some examples are given in Fig. 7.2.
cultural transmission chain from generation to generation of learners and teach-
ers.
Possible “society types”: There are three different possible scenarios in the cultural
transmission chains we saw in our experiments: behaviour can emerge from
previously random-response agents; it can be maintained in stable chains; finally,
these stable chains can break back down into random-response agents. If we treat
each of these as a possible aspect of a society (“emergence”, “breakdowns” and
“stable chains”) we can distinguish 23 = 8 different social “profiles” (Table 7.1).
• 4 out of these 8 society types have no stable chains (for example, populations
with tlearn equal to 1, 3 or 5 minutes). These are degenerate societies full of
random-response agents; there are no learners, maintainers or constructors. We
will group all of them together and classify them as Type E. An example of a
Type E society, made up of random agents without any stable chains can be seen
in Fig. 7.2c.
• Type C and Type D societies have stable chains but no emergent behaviour;
agents belonging to these societies are learners and maintainers but not con-
structors. When initialised with a certain behaviour, these society types either
maintain the behaviour indefinitely with no breakdowns (Type C) or break down
at some point and degenerate into Type E societies. If there is no initial ex-
pert, since there is no emergence they are again indistinguishable from Type E
societies.
We have no examples of such societies in our experiments, as any interaction
time that is long enough for learning (which is a prerequisite for stable chains)
is also long enough for behaviour to eventually emerge. Significantly altering
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Figure 7.2: Three examples of different society types. (a): Type A societies include
behaviour emergence, stable chains and breakdowns; different types of behaviour
emerge, are maintained in chains and break down. (b): In Type B societies, behaviour
(in this case, “left” dancing) emerges and is maintained indefinitely in stable chains. (c):
Type E societies consist of random-response agents; there are no successful chains.
some aspects of our learning algorithm (for example, dopamine DAr and DAp
values; see section 6.1.3) could lead to such chains; however, without further
work we cannot say whether Type C or Type D societies are eventually possible.
• Type B societies are societies in which one type of behaviour eventually emerges
and, since there are no breakdowns, is maintained indefinitely. Agents are learn-
ers, (perfect) maintainers and constructors. Longer learning times (15 and 20
minutes) lead to such societies; an example for tlearn = 15m is seen in Fig. 7.2b.
• Finally, the most interesting societies are Type A societies, in which either “right”
or “left” behaviour emerges and is maintained for some time in a transmission
chain. Agents in Type A societies are learners, constructors and imperfect main-
tainers. At some point the chain breaks into random-response agents, but even-
tually behaviour (not necessarily of the same type as before) emerges again and
the cycle restarts. Type A chains societies appear for learning times between 10
and 14 minutes; an example for tlearn = 12m is given in Fig. 7.2a.
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7.5 Teacher resilience
An interesting point that we raised in Chapter 5 was the presence of a “hidden” trait of
agents that is not always visible in their response rates as learners but potentially in-
fluences their “teaching” ability. We used the weight ratio wL/wR to measure this trait
(wL being the combined weights of the connective pathway leading to “left” responses
and wR the equivalent measure for “right” responses). The weight ratio directly influ-
ences response rates, but after these reach ceiling values (100% right or left responses)
any further changes of the ratio in the same direction have no further effect during the
agent’s learning phase.
During its teaching phase, however, the agent is paired with a possibly “unco-
operative” learner, leading to crashes, punishment and lowering of weights for both
learner and teacher. If the weight ratio value is close enough to the threshold, any fur-
ther weight decreases can lead to visible changes in the teacher’s response rates. The
weight ratio, then, is a measure of how easily influenced an agent is by an uncoopera-
tive dancing partner. We can call the equivalent trait an agent’s resilience.
Breakdown prediction: Low or decreasing teacher resilience can be a predictor of
a chain that is about to fail. Looking at success rates only, a chain can appear
perfectly stable; if teacher resilience is low, however, this stability is fragile and
can be easily influenced by an “uncooperative” learner. (We gave a detailed
account of a case where this happens in section 5.4.)
Determinants for resilience: There are two main factors that determine an agent’s
resilience; the first being the time spent dancing while the second being the
maximum value that an agent’s weight ratio is allowed to reach.
1. The more time a learning agent spends dancing with their teacher, the
higher the weights of the “correct” neural pathway; this leads to a high
weight ratio and high resilience. Longer tlearn times translate to more time
spent dancing; treset, however, also has an effect: resetting the agents’ po-
sitions too often leads to more time spent trying to find each other and less
time spent dancing.
2. After any of the weights reach the wmax value, all weights stop increasing
(see section 4.1.1). This maximum weight limit also sets a limit for an
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agent’s weight ratio3; higher values of wmax, then, would also lead to higher
agent resilience.
Theoretically, changing the value of wmax would alter the stability of trans-
mission chains for given learning time ranges. Removing wmax altogether
could lead to a very low range of learning times for which the system ex-
hibits interesting behaviour such as the “Type A” societies we described in
the previous section.
In practice, it remains to be seen how much of an effect it would have;
this could be a potential direction for future work, although in section 7.7
we will make a case against the relevancy of parameter exploration for our
thesis.
Behavioural measure of resilience: We have been using the weight ratio wL/wR as
an internal, “biological” measure of agent resilience. This, as well as the use of
any equivalent internal measures, is only possible because of the simplicity of the
agent’s neural network (which conveniently has very distinct “left response” and
“right response” pathways). More complex neural networks (which are needed
for any widening of this work’s scope, as we discuss in section 7.7.3) will make
it difficult (but not impossible; see Beer, 2000), to cleanly associate network
measures with behavioural traits.
A behavioural, rather than internal, measure that could be used to determine an
agent’s resilience comes from reversing the context the agent is in by pairing
it with an expert agent dancing in the opposite direction. In this scenario, the
non-expert agent’s behaviour will eventually swap from “left” to “right” or vice
versa; how long this takes is a direct measure of the agent’s resilience.
Masked traits: In a discussion about biological and linguistic co-evolution, Deacon
(2003) introduces the notion of evolutionary masking of genetic change. A
masked genetic factor (this can be a gene, an allele, or even a trait) is hidden,
or “shielded”, from natural selection. Some obvious ways that this can happen
3This limit, however, is not straightforward to calculate as it also depends on the rate at which the
weights are increasing. As an example, if wL is increasing at a high rate, the value of wR when wL
reaches wmax will be low and the maximum weight ratio wL/wR will be high; a lower weight increase
rate would lead to a lower maximum weight ratio. In turn, the rate of weight increase depends on how
quickly the agents start dancing after they make a “decision” about which way to turn; this is stochastic,
as it can change depending on the orientation of the agents when they happen to wander in sensory range
of each other, which is random.
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include unexpressed genetic change and recessive alleles whose effect is sup-
pressed by a dominant allele.
However, even if a genetic change is actually expressed (for example, as the
degradation of one of the organism’s former functions), it can be hidden from
natural selection in a low-competition environment or niche where this loss of
function does not lead to vastly different fitness (Deacon, 2003, p. 10). In the
same way, environmental changes can also lead to the unmasking of genetic
changes that were neutral before, but now somehow interact with the agent’s
fitness (Deacon, 2003, p. 12).
Of course, there can be no direct equivalent to this process in our system, as
there is no selective pressure on any of our agents’ traits. Nevertheless, there
are definite similarities between traits masked from natural selection and teacher
resilience as a “hidden” trait. As long as resilience (measured as the wL/wR
weight ratio) is above a certain threshold, it is a masked trait: any changes or
degradation in resilience do not affect the agent’s behaviour (response rate) and
are thus not “expressed”.
Significant enough degradation, however, combined with environmental factors
(an “uncooperative” dancing partner) lead to resilience being unmasked as a trait:
it now affects behaviour, causing the agent’s response rates to drop; since this
propagates to the next agents, it potentially leads to a chain breakdown.
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7.6 Regularisation
One of the questions we tried to answer in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 was whether
the agents in a transmission chain tend to match the response rates of their teachers or
regularise to high rates of either “right” or “left” behaviour. In order to explain why
this is relevant, we need to look at an important property of language: predictability.
Most natural languages are regular; linguistic forms are of course variable, but they
are predictable in their variability (Smith and Wonnacott, 2010). As can be seen during
the formation of novel languages, even initially unpredictable languages go through a
process of regularisation (Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005). In the same way, even
when a language is transmitted through non-native speakers who introduce unpre-
dictable variation (“probabilistic grammatical tendencies”, see Hudson Kam and New-
port, 2009), this variation disappears through the process of learning and the learned
language is regularised.
On the other hand, experiments show that humans match the variability of lan-
guages they learn as adults (Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005, p. 153):4 if, for exam-
ple, two interchangeable linguistic forms A and B are encountered in a non-predictable
way with probabilities equal to pA and pB respectively in a language, adult learners
of that language tend to produce the forms with those same probabilities (Smith and
Wonnacott, 2010, p.444). If that is the case, how is it that languages become regular?
One answer comes from the experiments of Hudson Kam and Newport (2005);
these show that while adults tend to match the variation of languages they are taught,
this is not the case for children, who typically regularise. Languages, then, become reg-
ular when “passing through” young learners. Another, complementary answer comes
from the iterated learning experiments of Smith and Wonnacott (2010), which show
that an initially unpredictable semi-artificial language, passed from generation to gen-
eration of learners in a transmission chain, keeps its variability but becomes fully pre-
dictable. The process of iterated learning, then, can amplify any regularising tenden-
cies speakers might have and lead to predictable languages.
Returning to our system, are our robot agents probability matching (similar to adult
language learners) or do they regularise (similar to children learners)? As we discussed
in Chapters 5 and 6, there are several signs that they are biased towards regularisation:
4There is evidence that adults also tend to regularise when the stimuli they are exposed to are too
complex to learn (Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005, p. 157). This points to adults having (weak) biases
towards regularisation.
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(i) Looking at chain examples for learning times of 12, 15 and 20 minutes, most
stable chains seem to have 100% “right” or “left” response rates (Fig. 5.3a, c;
Fig. 6.4a, b). Any drops in response rates do not persist; chains tend to ei-
ther break down or go back up to 100% rates. This is more pronounced for 15
minute learning times, while 20 minute learning times never fall below 100%
rates. Note, however, that there are some examples of chains that seem to be
probability matching, as they maintain relatively stable sub-100% response rates
over several generations (Fig. 5.3d).
(ii) Response rate inheritance dynamics plots for experiments with regular stable
chains (tlearn = 12m and 15m) tend not to have many points proximal to the x = y
identity line that represents probability matching (Fig. 5.8, 6.5). This is con-
firmed by the relatively low R2 values, indicating that the x = y line fits poorly to
the inheritance data (Table 5.1).
(iii) Finally, another indication that most agents regularise is the frequency of the
different types of inheritance dynamics shown in Fig. 6.6: for both 12 minute
and 15 minute learning times (although especially so for the latter), the number
of agents matching their teacher’s rate is relatively low.
However, there are also a lot of unanswered questions. These results, especially
for 12 minute learning time chains, are not conclusive; the inheritance dynamics plots
are not easy to interpret, and as we mentioned there are examples of agents that seem
to be probability matching. More importantly, we do not know if agents learning in an
isolated pair context would probability match or regularise; further testing is needed to
determine that, as maybe the transmission of behaviour through chains is the cause of
any regularisation effect. Finally, it is also plausible that “lifelong” learning also plays
an important role, as it means that teacher response rates can also change in response
to the learner.
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7.7 Future work
The work we described in this thesis is only a first step towards the more ambitious goal
of a full autopoietic account of language evolution; it also has numerous constraints
and potentially eliminable assumptions. The upside to this is that it provides a plethora
of open questions to be answered by future research. Broadly speaking, we could
divide these open questions into two groups. The first group would be parameter
variation: determining how various parameters of the system — weight freezing and
wmax, learning times, dopamine reward values, “lifelong” learning and many others —
influence the system behaviour. The second group would be exploratory expansion,
trying to build on the system we have detailed instead of trying to better understand it.
The goal of this thesis, however, is not to fully explain or understand how the mech-
anism of transmission chains of joint behaviour works; rather, the goal is to provide a
“proof of concept” that there do exist parameters that enable such transmission chains
to appear in the system. Therefore, instead of focusing future work on an exploration
of how varying system parameters would influence aspects of the system, we would
suggest that it makes more sense, after having established that transmission chains are
possible, to next try and expand the system’s behaviour.
In this spirit, in the rest of this chapter we will detail four possible “exploratory”
research directions: communication games, populations of agents, complex networks
and physical robots.
7.7.1 Communication games
There are two components that are common in most of the Iterated Learning exper-
iments: a cultural transmission chain and a communication system (usually, but not
always, a collection of meaning to signal associations). This communication system
is initially stochastic, which makes it difficult to learn; as it goes through the cul-
tural transmission chain, a pressure for learnability leads the communication system
to evolve and become more structured in some way. This increase in structure also
makes the learners progressively better at whatever task they are using the language
for. (Of course, as we saw in section 2.2.1.3, this is a simplistic view of iterated learn-
ing research; more recent research explores more factors that just this pressure for
learnability.
So far, we have established that an autopoietic “version” of the cultural transmis-
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sion chain is possible. The next step in an autopoietic account of Iterated Learning
must then be the transmission of an evolvable communication system. This means that
we need to make a transition from a simple joint action task (“L/R dancing”) to a com-
munication game. That said, adapting our task to one that makes use of signalling is
not straightforward, as we need a signalling system that supports at least two signals
if we want the system to be evolvable. A signalling system that is only comprised of
one signal is binary in its success; it can either fail or fully succeed, and there is no
potential for a middle ground and thus no potential for a gradual evolution.
We will give here an example of a minimal communication game that still supports
an evolvable communication system: the L/R/* dancing game. The game is based on
the L/R dancing task, with two additions: a new agent role (“follower”, as opposed to
the left or right “leader” agents); and a signalling system made of two signals, SA and
SB.
L/R/* dancing game description
Leader role: The role of leaders is similar to the L/R dancing task; an ideal leader still
always responds with “right” or “left” behaviour. In addition to this, however,
they also produce a respective signal — for example, SA when turning right and
SB when turning left.
Follower role: The role of followers is to appropriately react to the leader’s signal;
for example, by turning right for the SA signal and left for SB. In other words,
followers are flexible and adapt to the leader’s turning direction.
Assigning roles: As agents need to learn both leader and follower roles from their
teachers, the roles need to be randomly assigned for each interaction attempt.
This random assignment could also depend on an environmental factor, giving
some degree of ecological plausibility.
Initial and ideal communication systems: An ideal communication system would
be the one we described above: a one-to-one correspondence between the signal
space (SA, SB) and the behavioural space (“turn right”, “turn left”). The initial
communication system, however, should be ambiguous or stochastic. (An ex-
ample of ambiguous behaviour would be the production of both SA and SB by a
leader turning “right”; a stochastic behaviour could involve the follower turning
“right” 80% of the time and “left” 20% of the time when receiving an SA signal.)
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Figure 7.3: A truth table describing the L/R/* dancing game. Some values (indicated
with question marks) are variable, as they depend on the production rules for leaders
(shown in green) and reception rules for followers (shown in red).
This initial imperfection is required if we want the communication system to be
potentially evolvable.
Neural network inputs and outputs: A neural network capable of learning all three
possible roles (“R-leader”, “L-leader”, “*-follower”) needs four input nodes
(two nodes for SA and SB signal reception; one node for proximity detection;
and one node that corresponds to the agent’s current role) and four output nodes
(two nodes for turning “right” and “left”, two nodes for SA and SB signal pro-
duction).5 A truth table describing the L/R/* dancing game is shown in Fig. 7.3.
(Note that the production and reception rules are encoded in the neural network.)
We should note at this point that, despite the fact that a communication system
would seem like a straightforward addition to our system that would bring it closer
to the Iterated Learning model and to the study of less controversially “linguistic”
phenomena, such an addition is more challenging than it may appear. Despite the
simplicity of the task that we used for the experiments in this thesis, we had to make a
5Of course, the network will need to be more complex than the minimal one we have been using so
far; see section 7.7.3 for a relevant discussion.
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number of concessions in the biological plausibility of our learning algorithm in order
for the task to be learnable by out agents.
The leap from this task that could be learned by agents with a 1-input, 1-output
network to one that involves signalling and requires a 4-input, 4-output task is very
steep. In essence, what we are encountering here is a manifestation of the “scaling
up” issue of non-representational cognitive science that we described in section 1.4:
while explaining simple tasks in non-representational terms is often possible, the real
challenge comes in trying to scale the task complexity.
7.7.2 Populations of agents
The transmission chains we described in our experiments are supposed to be “minia-
ture societies” of agents, mimicking the transmission of behaviour from generation to
generation in cycles of learning and teaching. However, in real societies transmission
does not only happen vertically, from generation to generation, but also horizontally,
within the members of a generation itself.6 Equivalently, each generation has a popu-
lation of agents (instead of just one agent in our case).
It would be intriguing, then, to see what kind of population effects would emerge
by adding a horizontal transmission aspect to our system. The basis for this addition is
actually already present:
Locomotion: Agents can already move around in physical space; the default agent
behaviour is random wandering.
Dancing initiation: Agents already spontaneously initiate dancing; there is no need
for a mechanism that randomly chooses agents and forces them to interact.
Periodic agent creation and removal: Each agent already has a predetermined life-
time (2 · tlearn), after which they are removed from the simulation and replaced
with a new learner.
However, just adding more agents to each generation would not work; the following
aspects need to be modified first:
Spawning point: All new agents that enter the simulation are now placed in the same
position; this would have to change. New agents could be placed in random
positions, or in the former positions of the agents they are replacing.
6We mentioned some horizontal (Steels, 2015) and integrative (Theisen-White et al., 2011) ap-
proaches to experimental semiotics in section 2.2.
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Decoupling from dancing: In the existing system, agents are forced to decouple from
dancing after a time of treset and reset to their initial positions. This only works
since just two agents are interacting at any time; for a population of agents, we
would need to have a way for agents to “naturally” decouple from dancing.
The choice of spawning point for new agents is especially important: many inter-
esting population effects, such as subcultures of “right” or “left” agents in different
parts of the world or border effects where these subcultures meet, could depend on the
initial positioning of agents in space.
7.7.3 More complex & spiking networks
One of the main shortcomings of our system is the simplicity of the neural network we
used, which only has 5 nodes and is barely recurrent; while it is enough for the simple
L/R dancing task, any more complicated task (such as the L/R/* game we described
in section 7.7.1) will also need a more complex network. However, how would that
network be designed? Randomly instantiating networks does not work, as most ran-
dom networks have very unbalanced initial response rates and are thus not suitable for
learning. There are at least two possible solutions to this issue:
Evolutionary search: One possible approach is to search the space of random net-
works for ones that are good candidates for learning using genetic algorithms.
From an ecological perspective, it makes sense: organisms that can learn do
not have “randomly instantiated” nervous systems. Rather, learning is a func-
tion that has evolved over long timescales and that requires specialised nervous
system structures.
Of course, evolving learning as a function is an extremely ambitious goal and a
research project in itself. What we are suggesting, though, is not to attempt to
evolve learning, but rather to evolve networks by selecting them for their learning
capacity, while still using the “tag & reward” learning mechanism we detailed in
section 4.1. We have already tested this approach with mixed results; however,
we used an earlier, flawed version of the learning algorithm. We did not continue
pursuing it due to both time constraints and the fact that a simpler, hand-crafted
network was sufficient for the minimal version of the L/R dancing task.
Spiking networks: A more principled and biologically plausible approach, however,
would be to switch to large scale spiking networks instead of the recurrent neu-
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ral network (RNN) implementation we are currently using. In general, while the
RNN implementation of the distal reward algorithm (Izhikevich, 2007) works
well for our basic network, it requires “stop gap” measures that nullify its ad-
vantage over spiking implementations (namely, computational complexity) and
make its scaling ability uncertain.
As the working model of reinforcement learning by Izhikevich (2007) demon-
strates, even randomly instantiated spiking networks can successfully learn. We
postulate two reasons for this: firstly, the response decision (for example, for
“right” and “left” behaviour) is not based on the activation of single neurons,
but on the averaged activation of areas of neurons. Secondly, the scale of the
network means that, despite random connections, all areas of the network have
similar average activations.
7.7.4 Physical robots
Finally, as we mentioned in section 7.2, the modularity of our system allows us to easily
replace the simulated e-pucks we have been using for all our experiments with physical
robots. The use of physical robots can have certain advantages over simulated ones (see
section 3.2.1 for a discussion), so this constitutes an interesting future possibility (and
was also our original plan). There are two issues that need to be addressed, however:
Infrared sensors: E-puck robots use infrared sensors for proximity detection; how-
ever, a combination of the limited range of the sensors and the clear plastic build
of the e-pucks (Fig. 3.2) made it so that they cannot reliably “see” each other.
Possible ways around this are discussed in Longchamp et al. (2007).
Agent manipulation: In a simulator, it is easy to remove or add agents automatically;
with physical robots, they have to be manipulated directly by the experimenter.
This can be difficult, especially for longer chain experiments. A way around this
would be to “virtually” replace agents by only overwriting their nervous system;
this means, however, that since the robots cannot be manually moved around in
space, dancing agents need to have a “decoupling” mechanism that stops them
from dancing and moves them temporarily away from each other. Furthermore,
it means that that new learner agents will be necessarily placed in the same space
as the agents they are replacing.
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7.8 A closing note
In the very beginning of this thesis, we stated our aspiration to do “philosophy of mind
using a screwdriver” (Harvey, 2000). From the system design we described in Chapter
3, to the experiments of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and finally the discussion in this chapter, it
is apparent (we hope!) that we have, indeed, been using a screwdriver. Does this leave
us any wiser, however, regarding the “philosophy of mind” part?
We would like to think that it does; by showing that transmission chains can be
built from the bottom up, with as few operational assumptions as possible, we have
placed the first screw in the construction of a bridge between pre-symbolic cognition
and language. Admittedly, it is but a small screw, and the bridge will need many more
to be stable. As we saw in this last chapter, however, the next step —an evolvable
communication system— is definitely within reach, and it will place our experiments
in proper “iterated learning” ground. There is a plan (and we have a screwdriver!).
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